Law Commons^™

Pay For Regulator Performance, Frederick Tung, M Todd Henderson

Faculty Scholarship

Few doubt that executive compensation arrangements encouraged the excessive risk taking by banks that led to the recent Financial Crisis. Accordingly, academics and lawmakers have called for the reform of banker pay practices. In this Article, we argue that regulator pay is to blame as well, and that fixing it may be easier and more effective than reforming banker pay. Regulatory failures during the Financial Crisis resulted at least in part from a lack of sufficient incentives for examiners to act aggressively to prevent excessive risk. Bank regulators are rarely paid for performance, and in atypical cases involving performance bonus …

The Consumer Indebtedness Crisis: Law School Clinics As Laboratories For Generating Effective Legal Responses, Peggy Maisel

Faculty Scholarship

For the legal system to operate effectively, it must address problems arising from the absence of needed laws, or, if enacted, of laws that have been drafted poorly or are not being implemented in a fair and just manner. Since law schools are generally part of a larger university community, they are uniquely placed to serve as laboratories to find solutions to such problems, perhaps nowhere more so than in their legal clinics. The latter have in fact often played the role of legal innovators, but their contributions to the law and therefore to society at large have been little …

Pay For Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation For Risk Regulation, Frederick Tung

Faculty Scholarship

Excessive risk taking by firm managers did not originate with the Financial Crisis of 2007-08. Though bankers had special incentives to take big risks in the period before the Crisis, the incentive effects of equity-based compensation have been understood for some time. Among other things, equity compensation tends to induce greater risk taking by aligning managers’ risk preferences with those of equity holders. Longstanding government guaranties of bank liabilities additionally served to intensify bankers’ risk taking incentives.

I propose to ameliorate this gambler’s incentive with a new approach to compensation at the largest banks, one that explicitly accounts for the …