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Full-Text Articles in Law

Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker Dec 2019

Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

Mutual funds, pension funds and other institutional investors are a growing presence in U.S. equity markets, and these investors frequently hold large stakes in shares of competing companies. Because these common owners might prefer to maximize the values of their portfolios of companies, rather than the value of individual companies in isolation, this new reality has lead to a concern that companies in concentrated industries with high degrees of common ownership might compete less vigorously with each other than they otherwise would. But what mechanism would link common ownership with reduced competition? Some commentators argue that one of the most …


The Other Janus And The Future Of Labor’S Capital, David H. Webber Nov 2019

The Other Janus And The Future Of Labor’S Capital, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Two forms of labor’s capital—union funds and public pension funds—have profoundly reshaped the corporate world. They have successfully advocated for shareholder empowerment initiatives like proxy access, declassified boards, majority voting, say on pay, private fund registration, and the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. They have also served as lead plaintiffs in forty percent of federal securities fraud and Delaware deal class actions. Today, much-discussed reforms like revised shareholder proposal rules and mandatory arbitration threaten two of the main channels by which these shareholders have exercised power. But labor’s capital faces its greatest, even existential, threats from outside corporate law. This Essay addresses …


Employer Losses And Deferred Compensation, David I. Walker Oct 2019

Employer Losses And Deferred Compensation, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

Most large public companies offer their executives the opportunity to defer the receipt and taxation of their salary or other current compensation until retirement or some other future date, and equity compensation, which also entails deferral of pay and taxation, constitutes a large fraction of the typical executive pay package. Conventional wisdom holds that employer net operating losses (NOLs) improve the joint economics of deferred and equity compensation (henceforth together "deferred compensation") for the parties. However, empirical studies provide little evidence of an association between employer NOLs and deferred compensation use. This paper focuses on two potential explanations for this …


Automation And Jobs: When Technology Boosts Employment, James Bessen Oct 2019

Automation And Jobs: When Technology Boosts Employment, James Bessen

Faculty Scholarship

Will new technologies cause industries to shed jobs, requiring novel policies to address mass unemployment? Sometimes productivity-enhancing technology increases industry employment instead. In manufacturing, jobs grew along with productivity for a century or more; only later did productivity gains bring declining employment. What changed? The elasticity of demand. Using data over two centuries for US textile, steel and auto industries, this paper shows that automation initially spurred job growth because demand was highly elastic. But demand later became satiated, leading to job losses. A simple model explains why this pattern might be common, suggesting that today's technologies may cause some …


Reforming Pensions While Retaining Shareholder Voice, David H. Webber May 2019

Reforming Pensions While Retaining Shareholder Voice, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Public pension and labor union funds have been the driving force in diversified shareholder activism. They have also fended off attacks on jobs and proactively created jobs for fund contributors. These funds currently represent almost $4 trillion in assets over which workers have substantial control. That worker control - and the collective nature of defined benefit pension plans - is the necessary precondition for their shareholder activism. Both worker control and collective investment are directly threatened by the rise of defined contribution funds, particularly by well-funded efforts to promote the 401(k) in the public sector, the last bastion of the …


Using The Anglo-American Respondeat Superior Principle To Assign Responsibility For Worker Statutory Benefits And Protections, Michael C. Harper Jan 2019

Using The Anglo-American Respondeat Superior Principle To Assign Responsibility For Worker Statutory Benefits And Protections, Michael C. Harper

Faculty Scholarship

When viewed flexibly, not to find doctrinal rules, but rather to find insight from judges' collective judgment on social values, the common law may have particular value for modern policy makers. For instance, a common law insight could set policy makers in both the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.) on a promising path for defining when workers are to be protected and benefitted by employment statutes. That insight reflects the underlying rationale for the common law that made relevant the initial distinction between employees and independent contractors - the common law of vicarious liability through respondeat superior. …


A Common-Sense Defense Of Janus: Forthcoming Changes In The Public Sector, Maria O'Brien Jan 2019

A Common-Sense Defense Of Janus: Forthcoming Changes In The Public Sector, Maria O'Brien

Faculty Scholarship

Many scholars and others have, for some time now, been calling attention to the alarming growth in post-employment and other benefits for unionized employees in the public sector. 17 A fairly well-understood phenomenon is thought to explain the inability of state and local governments to resist outsized demands from their public unions. As 18 Is and others 19 have argued, the central problem with public sector unions is that they find it easy to capture their employers (taxpayers) in ways that private sector unions cannot. The role played by often eager and feckless elected officials in this process has also …