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The Odyssey Of Cass Sunstein, James E. Fleming Jul 2008

The Odyssey Of Cass Sunstein, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

I am delighted to participate in this symposium honoring and criticizing the scholarship of Cass Sunstein. Let me begin by stating something so obvious that we typically don't say it: Cass is the most remarkably thoughtful, constructive, and productive scholar of his (and my) generation, the generation of scholars born around the time that Brown v. Board of Education1 was decided. No one has addressed a wider range of important subjects or made a more substantial contribution to our understanding of law. I have been fruitfully engaging with his scholarship from my first article 2 to my two recent books.3 …


Rewriting Brown, Resurrecting Plessy, James E. Fleming Jul 2008

Rewriting Brown, Resurrecting Plessy, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

It is an honor and a pleasure to ponder Cooper v. AaronI and the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education2 in general and to respond to David A. Strauss's wise and insightful Childress Lecture3 in particular. I want to address three topics. The first two are encapsulated in my title: Rewriting Brown, Resurrecting Plessy. I'll examine the widespread phenomenon of "rewriting Brown." And I'll document what I shall call "resurrecting Plessy": the phenomenon, evident in both liberal and conservative scholarship and opinions, of charging one's opponents with repeating the mistakes of Plessy v. Ferguson.4 I'll illustrate the liberal version …


Sovereignty As Discourse, Robert L. Tsai Apr 2008

Sovereignty As Discourse, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This is a review of Howard Schweber's book, "The Language of Liberal Constitutionalism" (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Schweber argues that "the creation of a legitimate constitutional regime depends on a prior commitment to employ constitutional language, and that such a commitment is both the necessary and sufficient condition for constitution making." I critique the power and limits of this reformulated Lockean thesis, as well as Schweber's secondary claims that, for constitutional language to remain legitimate, it must increasingly become autonomous, specialized, and secular.


What Lurks Beneath: Nsa Surveillance And Executive Power Symposium: The Role Of The President In The Twenty-First Century, Gary S. Lawson Apr 2008

What Lurks Beneath: Nsa Surveillance And Executive Power Symposium: The Role Of The President In The Twenty-First Century, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

It is not surprising that, nearly two and a quarter centuries after ratification of the Federal Constitution, people are still actively arguing about the extent of the American President's powers.' The concept of executive power is notoriously murky,2 so disputes about its scope and character are virtually unavoidable. It is, however, at least a tad surprising that, nearly two and a quarter centuries after ratification of the Federal Constitution, people are still arguing about the constitutional sources of presidential power. 3 It is one thing to disagree about how far the President's power extends, but it is quite another thing …


A Truism With Attitude: The Tenth Amendment In Constitutional Context, Gary S. Lawson Jan 2008

A Truism With Attitude: The Tenth Amendment In Constitutional Context, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The Tenth Amendment is caught in a crossfire hurricane. From one direction, it is dismissed as "but a truism"' with no significant constitutional function. From another direction, its unassuming language- "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people" 2-has inspired Byzantine doctrines concerning such matters as federal commandeering of state institutions,3 conditions on federal spending programs implemented by states,4 and federal regulation of state governmental institutions. 5 The Tenth Amendment thus appears to be either the constitutional equivalent of a …