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Administrative Law

Judicial review

Faculty Scholarship

Columbia Law School

Articles 1 - 15 of 15

Full-Text Articles in Law

Chevron'S Ghost Rides Again, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2023

Chevron'S Ghost Rides Again, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Gary Lawson has offered a remarkable account of the fate of the Chevron doctrine during a recent year in the Supreme Court, from August 2021 to June 2022. When one examines lower court decisions, petitions seeking review of those decisions, briefs filed by the parties, and transcripts of oral arguments, Chevron made frequent appearances during the year. But when one reads the published opinions of the Court, one finds virtually no reference to Chevron. Based on the published opinions of the Court, it was as if the Chevron decision did not exist.

The status of Chevron as a …


Re-Reading Chevron, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2021

Re-Reading Chevron, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Though increasingly disfavored by the Supreme Court, Chevron remains central to administrative law doctrine. This Article suggests a way for the Court to reformulate the Chevron doctrine without overruling the Chevron decision. Through careful attention to the language of Chevron itself, the Court can honor the decision’s underlying value of harnessing comparative institutional advantage in judicial review, while setting aside a highly selective reading that unduly narrows judicial review. This re-reading would put the Chevron doctrine – and with it, an entire branch of administrative law – on firmer footing.


Coordinating Injunctions, Bert I. Huang Jan 2020

Coordinating Injunctions, Bert I. Huang

Faculty Scholarship

Consider this scenario: Two judges with parallel cases are each ready to issue an injunction. But their injunctions may clash, ordering incompatible actions by the defendant. Each judge has written an opinion justifying her own intended relief, but the need to avoid conflicting injunctions presses her to make a further choice – “Should I issue the injunction or should I stay it for now?” Each must make this decision in anticipation of what the other will do.

This Article analyzes such a judicial coordination problem, drawing on recent examples including the DACA cases and the “sanctuary cities” cases. It then …


Internal Administrative Law Before And After The Apa, Gillian E. Metzger, Kevin M. Stack Jan 2017

Internal Administrative Law Before And After The Apa, Gillian E. Metzger, Kevin M. Stack

Faculty Scholarship

From his early work on social security to more recent scholarship excavating the first hundred years of administrative life in the United States, Professor Jerry L. Mashaw has forcefully argued for the centrality of “internal administrative law.” Internal administrative law, as Mashaw elaborates the term, is the set of practices, procedures, and pronouncements that administrative agencies adopt to structure their work. In his view, understanding administrative institutions and their promise for systemic legality depends upon recognizing their internal administrative law. Yet, as Mashaw observes, despite its importance, internal administrative law remains at the outskirts of the field of administrative law …


Formalism And Deference In Administration Law, Kristen E. Hickman, Jide O. Nzelibe, Thomas W. Merrill, Philip A. Hamburger, Jennifer Walker Elrod Jan 2015

Formalism And Deference In Administration Law, Kristen E. Hickman, Jide O. Nzelibe, Thomas W. Merrill, Philip A. Hamburger, Jennifer Walker Elrod

Faculty Scholarship

The topic for discussion is formalism and deference in administrative law. As we know, the landmark case of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council has changed the face of modern administrative law. The panel will address the rightness and limitations of Chevron deference, especially in the context of agency decisions on the scope of the agencies’ jurisdictional mandates. Should the federal courts defer, or should they not defer in this context? We need guidance. Justices Scalia and Thomas recently differed from Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Alito on these issues. Who is right, and why? Does the answer …


In Search Of Skidmore, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2014

In Search Of Skidmore, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Ever since 1827, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that when a court is interpreting a statute that falls within the authority of an administrative agency, the court in reaching its own judgment about the statute's meaning should give substantial weight to the agency's view. Repeated again and again over the years in varying formulations, this proposition found its apotheosis in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Jackson in 1944. His opinion took the proposition to be so obvious that no citation was required. Justice Jackson's typically incisive and memorable formulation stuck. It …


Serial Litigation In Administrative Law: What Can Repeat Cases Tell Us About Judicial Review, Gillian E. Metzger Jan 2012

Serial Litigation In Administrative Law: What Can Repeat Cases Tell Us About Judicial Review, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

In Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, Emily Meazell takes up the topic of serial administrative law litigation. These repeated rounds of challenges and remands, which Meazell finds are particularly prevalent in contexts of risk regulation, provide a new lens on court-agency relationships. Meazell closely reviews several instances of such litigation, spanning topics as diverse as endangered species, potential workplace carcinogens, and financial qualifications of nuclear plant operators. She argues that such close examination reveals a process of dialogue, with agencies ultimately (if not immediately) responding to judicial concerns and courts in turn acknowledging administrative responses.


Chevron'S Two Steps, Kenneth A. Bamberger, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2009

Chevron'S Two Steps, Kenneth A. Bamberger, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The framework for judicial review of administrative interpretations of regulatory statutes set forth in the landmark Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council decision prescribes two analytic inquiries, and for good reason. The familiar two-step analysis is best understood as a framework for allocating interpretive authority in the administrative state; it separates questions of statutory implementation assigned to independent judicial judgment (Step One) from questions regarding which the courts role is limited to oversight of agency decisionmaking (Step Two).

The boundary between a reviewing court's decision and oversight roles rests squarely on the question of statutory ambiguity. For while courts, …


On Capturing The Possible Significance Of Institutional Design And Ethos, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2009

On Capturing The Possible Significance Of Institutional Design And Ethos, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

At a recent conference, a new judge from one of the federal courts of appeal – for the United States, the front line in judicial control of administrative action-made a plea to the lawyers in attendance. Please, he urged, in briefing and arguing cases reviewing agency actions, help us judges to understand their broader contexts. So often, he complained, the briefs and arguments are limited to the particular small issues of the case. We get little sense of the broad context in which it arises – the agency responsibilities in their largest sense, the institutional issues that may be at …


Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2009

Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

A Constitution that strongly separates legislative from executive activity makes it difficult to reconcile executive adoption of regulations (that is, departmentally adopted texts resembling statutes and having the force of law, if valid) with the proposition that the President is not ‘to be a lawmaker’. Such activity is, of course, an essential of government in the era of the regulatory state. United States courts readily accept the delegation to responsible agencies of authority to engage in it, what we call ‘rulemaking’, so long as it occurs in a framework that permits them to assess the legality of any particular exercise. …


Citizens To Preserve Overton Park V. Volpe, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2004

Citizens To Preserve Overton Park V. Volpe, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

This essay is one of a series destined to appear in a Foundation Press book, Administrative Law Stories, now set for publication in the fall of 2005. The decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe represents a transition from political to judicial controls over decisions broadly affecting a wide range of community interests. Unmistakable and dramatic as it is, that transition is not universally applauded. But the transition was striking and quick. The late sixties and early seventies saw an explosion of new national legislation on social and environmental issues, that often provided explicitly or implicitly for citizen …


Supplemental Environmental Projects Have Been Effectively Used In Citizen Suits To Deter Future Violations As Well As To Achieve Significant Additional Environmental Benefits, Edward Lloyd Jan 2004

Supplemental Environmental Projects Have Been Effectively Used In Citizen Suits To Deter Future Violations As Well As To Achieve Significant Additional Environmental Benefits, Edward Lloyd

Faculty Scholarship

Supplemental Environmental Projects (SUPs) are environmentally benefical projects included in settlements of environmental law enforcement cases. Courts have addressed SEPs in two contexts: where proposed by parties in consent decrees and where courts have fashioned SEPs as apart of the relief ordered in an enforcement case. SEPs have been extensively used in both government and citizen enforcement cases despite the nearly universal absence of any explicit legislative authorization by Congress. Congress has tangentially recognized the place of SEPs in the penalty and deterrence scheme by giving the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Attorney General …


Risk Assessment Perspectives, Peter L. Strauss Jan 1996

Risk Assessment Perspectives, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

I have a slightly different subtitle for our session today, which I hope our panelists may consider in addressing the many challenges before them: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Risk Assessment under Diminished Resources. Allan Morrison introduced the resource problem at the end of yesterday's session. It is an important element of the problems we face.

I think another element of those problems is finding a reasoned way of addressing these issues. The contrast between reasoned decisionmaking and political football was also nicely in evidence yesterday, perhaps especially strongly for those of us who have been responsible for putting together these presentations. …


Regulatory Reform In A Time Of Transition, Peter L. Strauss Jan 1981

Regulatory Reform In A Time Of Transition, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

As Americans have become both disheartened at the performance of their governments and conscious of their penetration into what were once private lives, regulatory reform has been urged with increasing fervor at both federal and state levels. Some of the reform talk is lawyer's talk, some of it is directed to the most fundamental aspects of the government order, and there is a good bit in between. My purpose here is to examine a number of the directions being suggested at the federal level for regulatory reform during the coming decade. While it would be helpful also to consider state …


The Scope Of Judicial Review In French Administrative Law, George A. Bermann Jan 1977

The Scope Of Judicial Review In French Administrative Law, George A. Bermann

Faculty Scholarship

The arguments that may be raised in support of a claim of abuse of discretion must go to the legality, not just the wisdom or advisability, of administrative action. Though the judge is responsible for seeing to it that the government acts in conformity with law, he may not put himself in its place or interfere in its functioning. His job is not to determine whether in a given case a certain administrative official ought to have acted and, if so, in one particular way. He has neither the means nor the materials for judgments of this sort, nor does …