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Full-Text Articles in Law
Section 1: Moot Court, Fcc V. Fox Television Stations, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Section 1: Moot Court, Fcc V. Fox Television Stations, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Supreme Court Preview
No abstract provided.
Section 3: Election Law, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Section 3: Election Law, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Supreme Court Preview
No abstract provided.
Section 2: 2008 Election And The Supreme Court, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Section 2: 2008 Election And The Supreme Court, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Supreme Court Preview
No abstract provided.
Section 6: Theories Of Interpretation, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Section 6: Theories Of Interpretation, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Supreme Court Preview
No abstract provided.
Section 5: Civil Rights, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Section 5: Civil Rights, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Supreme Court Preview
No abstract provided.
Section 7: Criminal Law, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Section 7: Criminal Law, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Supreme Court Preview
No abstract provided.
Section 8: Bush's Legal Legacy, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Section 8: Bush's Legal Legacy, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Supreme Court Preview
No abstract provided.
Supreme Court Nominees And The Fourth Circuit Curse, Adam M. Gershowitz
Supreme Court Nominees And The Fourth Circuit Curse, Adam M. Gershowitz
Popular Media
No abstract provided.
Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look At The End Of Life And Personal Autonomy, Yale Kamisar
Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look At The End Of Life And Personal Autonomy, Yale Kamisar
Articles
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court declined to find a right to physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") in the Constitution. Not a single Justice dissented. One would expect such a ruling to be quite secure. But Lawrence v. Texas, holding that a state cannot make consensual homosexual conduct a crime, is not easy to reconcile with Glucksberg. Lawrence certainly takes a much more expansive view of substantive due process than did Glucksberg. It is conceivable that the five Justices who made up the Lawrence majority-all of whom still sit on the Court-might overrule Glucksberg. For various reasons, …
Cooper's Quiet Demise (A Short Response To Professor Strauss), Frederic M. Bloom
Cooper's Quiet Demise (A Short Response To Professor Strauss), Frederic M. Bloom
Publications
No abstract provided.
From Judge To Justice: Social Background Theory And The Supreme Court, Tracey E. George
From Judge To Justice: Social Background Theory And The Supreme Court, Tracey E. George
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The Roberts Court Justices already have revealed many differences from one another, but they also share a (possibly) significant commonality: Presidents promoted all of them to the U.S. Supreme Court from the U.S. Courts of Appeals. This means, of course, that they initially learned how to be judges while serving on a circuit court. How might the Justices' common route to the Court affect their actions on it? Social background theory hypothesizes that prior experience influences subsequent behavior such as voting, opinion writing, and coalition formation. This Article empirically analyzes promotion to the Supreme Court and examines the implications of …
Public Rights, Social Equality, And The Conceptual Roots Of The Plessy Challenge, Rebecca J. Scott
Public Rights, Social Equality, And The Conceptual Roots Of The Plessy Challenge, Rebecca J. Scott
Articles
This Article argues that the test case that gave rise to the 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson is best understood as part of a wellestablished, cosmopolitan tradition of anticaste activism in Louisiana rather than as a quixotic effort that contradicted nineteenth-century ideas of the boundaries of citizens' rights. By drawing a dividing line between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and social rights, on the other, the Supreme Court construed challenges to segregation as claims to a "social equality" that was beyond the scope of judicially cognizable rights. The Louisiana constitutional convention of 1867-68, however, had defined …
"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Tracey E. George, Chris Guthrie
"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Tracey E. George, Chris Guthrie
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this Essay--the first in a series of essays designed to reimagine the Supreme Court--we argue that Congress should authorize the Court to adopt, in whole or part, panel decision making... With respect to the prospect of different Court outcomes, we demonstrate empirically in this Essay that the vast majority of cases decided during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries--including "Grutter", "Roe", and "Bush v. Gore" --would have come out the same way if the Court had decided them in panels rather than as a full Court.
"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Chris Guthrie, Tracey E. George
"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Chris Guthrie, Tracey E. George
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this Essay--the first in a series of essays designed to reimagine the Supreme Court--we argue that Congress should authorize the Court to adopt, in whole or part, panel decision making... With respect to the prospect of different Court outcomes, we demonstrate empirically in this Essay that the vast majority of cases decided during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries--including "Grutter", "Roe", and "Bush v. Gore" --would have come out the same way if the Court had decided them in panels rather than as a full Court.
Is A Forensic Laboratory Report Identifying A Substance As A Narcotic 'Testimonial'?, Richard D. Friedman
Is A Forensic Laboratory Report Identifying A Substance As A Narcotic 'Testimonial'?, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Is a state forensic analyst's laboratory report, prepared for use in a criminal proceeding and identifying a substance as cocaine, "testimonial" evidence and so subject to the demands of the Confrontation Clause as set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)?
Does An Accused Forfeit The Confrontation Right By Murdering A Witness, Absent A Purpose To Render Her Unavailable?, Richard D. Friedman
Does An Accused Forfeit The Confrontation Right By Murdering A Witness, Absent A Purpose To Render Her Unavailable?, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
If an accused murdered a witness, should he be deemed to have forfeited the right under the Sixth Amendment "to be confronted with" the witness, absent proof that the accused committed the murder for the purpose of rendering her unavailable as a witness?
Waiting For The Other Shoe: Hudson And The Precarious State Of Mapp, David A. Moran
Waiting For The Other Shoe: Hudson And The Precarious State Of Mapp, David A. Moran
Articles
I have no idea whether my death will be noted in the New York Times. But if it is, I fear the headline of my obituary will look something like: "Professor Dies; Lost Hudson v. Michigan' in Supreme Court, Leading to Abolition of Exclusionary Rule." The very existence of this Symposium panel shows, I think, that my fear is well-grounded. On the other hand, I am not quite as fearful that Hudson foreshadows the complete overruling of Mapp v. Ohio2 and Weeks v. United States3 as I was when I published an article just three months after the Hudson decision …
Requiem For Section 1983, Paul D. Reingold
Requiem For Section 1983, Paul D. Reingold
Articles
Section 1983 no longer serves as a remedial statute for the people most in need of its protection. Those who have suffered a violation of their civil rights at the hands of state authorities, but who cannot afford a lawyer because they have only modest damages or seek only equitable remedies, are foreclosed from relief because lawyers shun their cases. Today civil rights plaintiffs are treated the same as ordinary tort plaintiffs by the private bar: without high damages, civil rights plaintiffs are denied access to the courts because no one will represent them. Congress understood that civil rights laws …
Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's Better Than It Looks, Theodore J. St. Antoine
Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's Better Than It Looks, Theodore J. St. Antoine
Articles
"Mandatory arbitration" as used here means that employees must agree as a condition of employment to arbitrate all legal disputes with their employer, including statutory claims, rather than take them to court. The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of such agreements on the grounds that they merely provide for a change of forum and not a loss of substantive rights. Opponents contend this wrongfully deprives employees of the right to a jury trial and other statutory procedural benefits. Various empirical studies indicate, however, that employees similarly situated do about as well in arbitration as in court actions, or even …
Pharma's Nonobvious Problem, Rebecca S. Eisenberg
Pharma's Nonobvious Problem, Rebecca S. Eisenberg
Articles
This Article considers the effect of the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. on the nonobviousness standard for patentability as applied to pharmaceutical patents. By calling for an expansive and flexible analysis and disapproving of the use of rigid formulas in evaluating an invention for obviousness, KSR may appear to make it easier for generic competitors to challenge the validity of drug patents. But an examination of the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence in the context of such challenges reveals that the Federal Circuit has been employing all along the sort of flexible …
When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus
When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus
Articles
Constitutional theory lacks an account of when each of the familiar sources of authority-text, original meaning, precedent, and so on-should be given weight. The dominant tendency is to regard all sources as potentially applicable in every case. In contrast, this Article proposes that each source of authority is pertinent in some categories of cases but not in others, much as a physical tool is appropriate for some but not all kinds of household tasks. The Article then applies this approach to identify the categories of cases in which original meaning is, or is not, a valid factor in constitutional decisionmaking.
Stoneridge Investment Partners V. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy Of Securities Class Action Reform, Adam C. Pritchard
Stoneridge Investment Partners V. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy Of Securities Class Action Reform, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
I begin in Part II by explaining the wrong turn that the Court took in Basic. The Basic Court misunderstood the function of the reliance element and its relation to the question of damages. As a result, the securities class action regime established in Basic threatens draconian sanctions with limited deterrent benefit. Part III then summarizes the cases leading up to Stoneridge and analyzes the Court's reasoning in that case. In Stoneridge, like the decisions interpreting the reliance requirement of Rule 10b-5 that came before it, the Court emphasized policy implications. Sometimes policy implications are invoked to broaden the reach …
The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision And Agency Interpretation: A Response To Galle And Seidenfeld, Nina A. Mendelson
The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision And Agency Interpretation: A Response To Galle And Seidenfeld, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld add some important strands to the debate on agency preemption, particularly in their detailed documentation of the potential advantages agencies may possess in deliberating on preemption compared with Congress and the courts. As they note, the quality of agency deliberation matters to two different debates. First, should an agency interpretation of statutory language to preempt state law receive Chevron deference in the courts, as other agency interpretations may, or should some lesser form of deference be given? Second, should a general statutory authorization to an agency to administer a program and to issue rules …