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Full-Text Articles in Law
An Event Study Of Patent Verdicts And Judicial Leakage, Bryan Engelhardt, Zachary Fernandes
An Event Study Of Patent Verdicts And Judicial Leakage, Bryan Engelhardt, Zachary Fernandes
Economics Department Working Papers
To check for the impartiality of the United States judicial system, we investigate whether judicial decisions are leaked prior to their public release. Utilizing an event study methodology, we test for leaked information by analyzing the effect of patent infringement verdicts on the stock prices of the firms involved before and after the public release of the verdict. We find evidence that at least some of the decisions are leaked prior to their public release.
Economic Windfalls And The Affordable Care Act: A Policy Proposal, Joshua Congdon-Hohman, Victor Matheson
Economic Windfalls And The Affordable Care Act: A Policy Proposal, Joshua Congdon-Hohman, Victor Matheson
Economics Department Working Papers
This paper identifies a major issue with windfall payments under either possible interpretation of the ACA as it currently stands. Several alternatives are proposed that would eliminate the windfalls. We advocate the establishment of a tort award funded “Federal Stabilization Fund” to improve the economic efficiency of future health care awards in the age of the Affordable Care Act
Monopoly Power With A Short Selling Constraint, Robert Baumann, Bryan Engelhardt, David L. Fuller
Monopoly Power With A Short Selling Constraint, Robert Baumann, Bryan Engelhardt, David L. Fuller
Economics Department Working Papers
We show if a speculator can benefit from reducing a monopoly’s rents through short selling, then a speculator may take a short position in a monopoly, overcome the barriers to entry, and compete with the monopoly. The competition drives down the monopoly’s rents, and as a result, the short position becomes profitable and covers the cost of entry. If entry is impossible, then the speculator may coordinate and pay the firm’s counter-parties to stop trading with the monopoly rather than entering. Either way, increasing a speculator’s ability to short a firm’s rents results in a constraint on the monopoly and …