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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Failure Of Liability In Modern Markets, Yesha Yadav
The Failure Of Liability In Modern Markets, Yesha Yadav
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In April 2015, the Department of Justice charged Navinder Sarao for his role in causing the Flash Crash-the near-1,000-point drop-and- rebound in the Dow Jones Index that roiled markets in May 2010. Sarao, a small-time British trader operating out of his parents' suburban basement, stood accused of putting together a string of illusory, fake orders that fooled markets enough to spark the largest single-day drop in the index's history. Commentators rightly contest whether a bit-player like Sarao could have unleashed a near-catastrophe on U.S. securities markets single-handedly. Yet, the complaint-and its causal account- point to a troubling dilemma facing scholars …
Insider Trading And Market Structure, Yesha Yadav
Insider Trading And Market Structure, Yesha Yadav
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article argues that the emergence of algorithmic trading raises a new challenge for the law and policy of insider trading. It shows that securities markets comprise a cohort of algorithmic “structural insiders” that – by virtue of speed and physical proximity to exchanges – systematically gain first access to information and play an outsize role in price formation. This Article makes three contributions. First, it introduces and develops the concept of structural insider trading. Securities markets increasingly rely on automated traders utilizing algorithms – or pre-programmed electronic instructions – for trading. Policy allows traders to enjoy important structural advantages: …
Quieting The Shareholders' Voice, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox, Fabrizio Ferri
Quieting The Shareholders' Voice, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox, Fabrizio Ferri
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers In A World With Weak Shareholder Litigation, Randall S. Thomas, James D. Cox
Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers In A World With Weak Shareholder Litigation, Randall S. Thomas, James D. Cox
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Because representative shareholder litigation has been constrained by numerous legal developments, the corporate governance system has developed new mechanisms as alternative means to address managerial agency costs. We posit that recent significant governance developments in the corporate world are the natural consequence of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of shareholder suits to address certain genre of managerial agency costs. We thus argue that corporate governance responses evolve to fill voids caused by the inability of shareholder suits to monitor and discipline corporate managers.
We further claim that these new governance responses are themselves becoming stronger due in part to the rising …