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Full-Text Articles in Law

Decoding Dobbs: A Typology To Better Understand The Roberts Court's Jurisprudence, Katie Yoder May 2024

Decoding Dobbs: A Typology To Better Understand The Roberts Court's Jurisprudence, Katie Yoder

Honors Projects

The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized Substantive Due Process (“SDP”) in the early twentieth century. In Lochner v. New York, the Court established that there are certain unenumerated rights that are implied by the Fourteenth Amendment.Though SDP originated in a case about worker’s rights and liberties, it quickly became relevant to many cases surrounding personal intimate decisions involving health, safety, marriage, sexual activity, and reproduction.Over the past 60 years, the Court relied upon SDP to justify expanding a fundamental right to privacy, liberty, and the right to medical decision making. Specifically, the court applied these concepts to allow for freedoms …


Children Seen But Not Heard, Stacey B. Steinberg Apr 2024

Children Seen But Not Heard, Stacey B. Steinberg

UF Law Faculty Publications

Children are expected to abide by the will of their parents. In the last 200 years, American jurisprudence has given parents the ability to control their children’s upbringing with few exceptions. The principle governing this norm is that parents know best and will use their better knowledge to protect their children’s welfare.

The COVID-19 pandemic, public school rules, and children’s privacy laws offer modern examples of regulations in which the interests of parents and children may not align. Minors may want access to vaccines, despite a parent’s refusal to sign a consent form. Minors may want to talk to their …


Content Moderation And The Least Cost Avoider, Paul Rosenzweig Apr 2024

Content Moderation And The Least Cost Avoider, Paul Rosenzweig

Joint PIJIP/TLS Research Paper Series

No abstract provided.


Distinguishing Privacy Law: A Critique Of Privacy As Social Taxonomy, María P. Angel, Ryan Calo Mar 2024

Distinguishing Privacy Law: A Critique Of Privacy As Social Taxonomy, María P. Angel, Ryan Calo

Articles

What distinguishes privacy violations from other harms? This has proven a surprisingly difficult question to answer. For over a century, privacy law scholars labored to define the elusive concept of privacy. Then they gave up. Efforts to distinguish privacy were superseded at the turn of the millennium by a new approach: a taxonomy of privacy problems grounded in social recognition. Privacy law became the field that simply studies whatever courts or scholars talk about as related to privacy.

Decades into privacy as social taxonomy, the field has expanded to encompass a broad range of information-based harms—from consumer manipulation to algorithmic …


Privacy Policy Indeterminacy, Christopher G. Bradley Jan 2024

Privacy Policy Indeterminacy, Christopher G. Bradley

Connecticut Law Review

Despite being subjected to decades of sharp criticism, privacy policies published by companies remain a linchpin of privacy regulation. Representations in these policies provide the main measure against which consumer privacy can be judged. Policies are rarely read by consumers. Instead, these policies are interpreted by company decision makers tasked with interpreting whether a proposed course of action is consistent with stated policies as well as underlying privacy law. To be effective, policies must constrain use of consumer data even when they are given a company-friendly reading.

Experimental evidence on the interpretation of privacy policies provides no grounds for encouragement …


The Automated Fourth Amendment, Maneka Sinha Jan 2024

The Automated Fourth Amendment, Maneka Sinha

Faculty Scholarship

Courts routinely defer to police officer judgments in reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations. Increasingly, though, police officers outsource these threshold judgments to new forms of technology that purport to predict and detect crime and identify those responsible. These policing technologies automate core police determinations about whether crime is occurring and who is responsible. Criminal procedure doctrine has failed to insist on some level of scrutiny of—or skepticism about—the reliability of this technology. Through an original study analyzing numerous state and federal court opinions, this Article exposes the implications of law enforcement’s reliance on these practices given the weighty interests …


The Trade Origins Of Privacy Law, Anupam Chander Jan 2024

The Trade Origins Of Privacy Law, Anupam Chander

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The desire for trade propelled the growth of data privacy law across the world. Countries with strong privacy laws sought to ensure that their citizens’ privacy would not be compromised when their data traveled to other countries. Even before this vaunted Brussels Effect pushed privacy law across the world through the enticement of trade with the European Union, Brussels had to erect privacy law within the Union itself. And as the Union itself expanded, privacy law was a critical condition for accession.

But this coupling of privacy and trade leaves a puzzle: how did the U.S. avoid a comprehensive privacy …


Unavoidability In U.S. Privacy Law, Laura M. Moy Jan 2024

Unavoidability In U.S. Privacy Law, Laura M. Moy

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Why is U.S. privacy law structured the way it is, with a series of sectoral laws rather than a cross-sectoral law or laws? Why does U.S. privacy law protect information shared in certain contexts—such as information shared with an attorney, a healthcare provider, or a financial provider—rather than particular types of information? One possibility is that sectoral laws apply to contexts in which people typically share highly “sensitive” information containing intimate secrets or with the potential to harm them financially or psychologically.

But this Article argues that there is something else at play—that in fact, an under-discussed and underappreciated factor …


Do Ais Dream Of Electric Boards?, Robert J. Rhee Jan 2024

Do Ais Dream Of Electric Boards?, Robert J. Rhee

UF Law Faculty Publications

When artificial intelligence (“AI”) acquires self-awareness, agency, and unique intelligence, it will attain ontological personhood. Management of firms by AI would be technologically and economically feasible. The law could confer AI with the status of legal personhood, as it did with the personhood of traditional business firms in the past, thus dispensing with the need for inserting AI as property within the legal boundary of a firm. As a separate and distinct entity, AI could function independently as a manager in the way that legal or natural persons do today: i.e., AI as director, officer, partner, member, or manager. Such …


Privacy Nicks: How The Law Normalizes Surveillance, Woodrow Hartzog, Evan Selinger, Johanna Gunawan Jan 2024

Privacy Nicks: How The Law Normalizes Surveillance, Woodrow Hartzog, Evan Selinger, Johanna Gunawan

Faculty Scholarship

Privacy law is failing to protect individuals from being watched and exposed, despite stronger surveillance and data protection rules. The problem is that our rules look to social norms to set thresholds for privacy violations, but people can get used to being observed. In this article, we argue that by ignoring de minimis privacy encroachments, the law is complicit in normalizing surveillance. Privacy law helps acclimate people to being watched by ignoring smaller, more frequent, and more mundane privacy diminutions. We call these reductions “privacy nicks,” like the proverbial “thousand cuts” that lead to death.

Privacy nicks come from the …


Constructing Ai Speech, Margot E. Kaminski, Meg Leta Jones Jan 2024

Constructing Ai Speech, Margot E. Kaminski, Meg Leta Jones

Publications

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems such as ChatGPT can now produce convincingly human speech, at scale. It is tempting to ask whether such AI-generated content “disrupts” the law. That, we claim, is the wrong question. It characterizes the law as inherently reactive, rather than proactive, and fails to reveal how what may look like “disruption” in one area of the law is business as usual in another. We challenge the prevailing notion that technology inherently disrupts law, proposing instead that law and technology co-construct each other in a dynamic interplay reflective of societal priorities and political power. This Essay instead deploys …