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Full-Text Articles in Law
Updating Senator Borah: A Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact, David A. Koplow
Updating Senator Borah: A Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact, David A. Koplow
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In recognizing the legacy of Senator William E. Borah, the author shares his remarks from the Borah Symposium at the University of Idaho, about the Senator's personality and character, his contribution and later characterization to international law and national security, specifically the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, and finally, a proposal to a modern reincarnation to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the newer threats of this era.
Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact: Proposing A Treaty For The Renunciation Of Nuclear Wars As An Instrument Of National Policy, David A. Koplow
Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact: Proposing A Treaty For The Renunciation Of Nuclear Wars As An Instrument Of National Policy, David A. Koplow
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article performs three functions. First, it offers a revisionist interpretation of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, the much-maligned treaty through which the key powers of the era, led by the United States, undertook to “outlaw” war, renouncing it as a tool of national policy and committing themselves to resort exclusively to pacific means for the resolution of their international disputes. Because of Kellogg-Briand’s inability to prevent the outbreak of World War II, the treaty has been derided for decades as a futile, utopian illusion, but this article argues that it was, in fact, a tremendous success in altering states’ attitudes …
Train Wreck: The U.S. Violation Of The Chemical Weapons Convention, David A. Koplow
Train Wreck: The U.S. Violation Of The Chemical Weapons Convention, David A. Koplow
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is one of the most important multilateral arms control instruments; it requires its 188 parties to refrain from producing, acquiring, retaining or using chemical weapons (CW) and to destroy their existing CW stockpiles by a fixed date. The United States and Russia declared the possession of the world’s largest CW inventories and have been working assiduously to incinerate, chemically neutralize or otherwise dispose of their respective caches. Unfortunately, neither country met the treaty’s April 29, 2012 final, non-extendable deadline. The United States managed to destroy 90% of its CW stocks on time, but under …
National Security Policy And Ratification Of The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Winston P. Nagan, Erin K. Slemmens
National Security Policy And Ratification Of The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Winston P. Nagan, Erin K. Slemmens
UF Law Faculty Publications
While no legal obstacles prevent the U.S. Senate's reconsideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), lingering doubts (about the effectiveness of the international treaty) and partisan politics (founded upon outdated ideologies of national sovereignty) may again foreclose the opportunity for the United States to lead a just and thorough regime of international arms control. By closely examining the U.S. Senate's previous rejection (and, by implication, the nation's non-ratification) of the CTBT, we assess the political process that failed to realize the security values now imperative to U.S. national defense. To this appraisal, we join analysis of the contemporary law, policy, …
Carrying A Big Carrot: Linking Multilateral Disarmament And Development Assistance, David A. Koplow, Philip G. Schrag
Carrying A Big Carrot: Linking Multilateral Disarmament And Development Assistance, David A. Koplow, Philip G. Schrag
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article proposes, as a new element of the "liberal internationalism" that should characterize the post-Cold War world, a simultaneous solution to these three problems. The nations of the world should negotiate a series of multilateral agreements to stop the spread of advanced weaponry, and include in each of them, as an overt incentive for developing states to accept the disarmament and verification obligations, provisions that explicitly require the affluent, developed states to make specified monetary and in-kind transfers to the third world parties. The new regime should also provide stronger-than-customary treaty procedures for clarifying ambiguities, adjudicating claims, and resolving …