Law Commons^™

Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”

This article is an effort to help courts and …

Some Important Causes For Settlement In American Civil Litigation, Felipe Forte Cobo

LLM Theses and Essays

This paper focuses on pure economic disputes such as contract, real property and tort conflicts, in which the economic efficiency model is very accepted. In this limited scenario, the consensual resolution of disputes is always more efficient than decisions made by a third-party decision-maker, whether from a post-trial or pre-trial perspective.

Considering that lower transaction costs drive parties towards settlement, part II of this essay provides an overview of the American costs of legal disputes, framing several issues that might be determinative to settlements. Part III explores how two specific American procedural institutes – discovery and civil jury trial – …

Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French

Journal Articles

In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …

Litigating Toward Settlement, Christina L. Boyd, David A. Hoffman

All Faculty Scholarship

Civil litigation typically ends when the parties compromise. While existing theories of settlement primarily focus on information exchange, we instead examine how motion practice, especially non-discovery motions, can substantially shape parties’ knowledge about their cases and thereby influence the timing of settlement. Using docket-level federal district court data, we find a number of strong effects regarding how motions can influence this process, including that the filing of a motion significantly speeds case settlement, that granted motions are more immediately critical to settlement timing than motions denied, and that plaintiff victories have a stronger effect than defendant victories. These results provide …

The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

This Article provides the first look at patent litigation hazards for public firms during the 1980s and 1990s. Litigation is more likely when prospective plaintiffs acquire more patents, when firms are larger and technologically close and when prospective defendants spend more on research and development ("R&D"). The latter suggests inadvertent infringement may be more important than piracy. Public firms face dramatically increased hazards of litigation as plaintiffs and even more rapidly increasing hazards as defendants, especially for small public firms. The increase cannot be explained by patenting rates, R&D, firm value or industry composition. Legal changes are the most likely …