Law Commons^™

Antitrust's "Jurisdictional" Reach Abroad, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law

In its Arbaugh decision the Supreme Court insisted that a federal statute’s limitation on reach be regarded as “jurisdictional” only if the legislature was clear that this is what it had in mind. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA) presents a puzzle in this regard, because Congress seems to have been quite clear about what it had in mind; it simply failed to use the correct set of buzzwords in the statute itself, and well before Arbaugh assessed this requirement.

Even if the FTAIA is to be regarded as non-jurisdictional, the constitutional extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act is …

A Primer On Antitrust Damages, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law

This paper considers the theory of antitrust damages and then discusses some simple models for proving them. Antitrust damages theory begins with the premise that many practices alleged to violate the antitrust laws cause no consumer harm. Others are inefficient and have few socially redeeming virtues. Still others may simultaneously increase both the efficiency of the participants and their market power. A perfectly designed antitrust policy would exonerate the first set of practices, condemn the second set, and condemn the third set only when the social cost of the restraint exceeds its social value or they produce net harm to …

Quantification Of Harm In Private Antitrust Actions In The United States, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law

This paper discusses the theory and experience of United States courts concerning the quantification of harm in antitrust cases. This treatment pertains to both the social cost of antitrust violations, and to the private damage mechanisms that United States antitrust law has developed. It is submitted for the Roundtable on the Quantification of Harm to Competition by National Courts and Competition Agencies, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Feb., 2011.

In a typical year more than 90% of antitrust complaints filed in the United States are by private plaintiffs rather than the federal government. Further, when the individual states …

Litigation And Democracy: Restoring A Realistic Prospect Of Trial, Stephen B. Burbank, Stephen N. Subrin

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law

In this essay we review some of the evidence confirming, and some of the reasons underlying, the phenomenon of the vanishing trial in federal civil cases and examine some of the costs of that phenomenon for democratic values, including in particular democratic values represented by the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. We discuss the Supreme Court’s recent pleading decisions in Twombly and Iqbal as examples of procedural attacks on democracy in four dimensions: (1) they put the right to jury trial in jeopardy; (2) they undercut the effectiveness of congressional statutes designed to compensate citizens for …

The Political Economy Of Fraud On The Market, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law

No abstract provided.

Process Choice, Cary Coglianese

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law

Regulation scholars have long searched for the best tools to use to achieve public policy goals, generating an extensive body of research on what has become known as instrument choice. By contrast, analysis of options for structuring how officials make regulatory decisions – process choice – remains in relative infancy. Notwithstanding the emphasis legal scholars and political economists have placed on administrative procedures, surprisingly little research has investigated why regulators choose among different process options or what value they and the public receive from different choices. In their book, Regulation by Litigation, Andrew Morriss, Bruce Yandle, and Andrew Dorchak …