Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Series

Litigation

Boston University School of Law

Litigation

Articles 1 - 7 of 7

Full-Text Articles in Law

Does The Quality Of The Plaintiffs' Law Firm Matter In Deal Litigation?, David Webber, Adam B. Badawi Jan 2015

Does The Quality Of The Plaintiffs' Law Firm Matter In Deal Litigation?, David Webber, Adam B. Badawi

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines how the stock market reacts to the filing of lawsuits against mergers and acquisitions targets as the quality of the plaintiffs’ law firm varies. Our primary dataset includes all cases of this type filed in the Delaware Chancery Court from November 2003–September 2008. We group the law firms that file these suits into higher and lower quality categories using several quantitative and qualitative measures. We hypothesize that target firm share value should reflect the likelihood that litigation will result in an increase in merger consideration. This effect is likely to depend, at least in part, on ...


Private Policing Of Mergers & Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment Of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs In Transactional Class And Derivative Actions, David Webber Jan 2014

Private Policing Of Mergers & Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment Of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs In Transactional Class And Derivative Actions, David Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Transactional class and derivative actions have long been controversial in both the popular and the academic literatures. Yet, the debate over such litigation has thus far neglected to consider a change in legal technology, adopted in Delaware a dozen years ago, favoring selection of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in these cases. This Article fills that gap, offering new insights into the utility of mergers and acquisitions litigation. Based on a hand-collected dataset of all Delaware class and derivative actions filed from November 1, 2003 to December 31, 2009, I find that institutional investors play as large of a role ...


Information, Litigation, And Common Law Evolution, Keith Hylton Jan 2006

Information, Litigation, And Common Law Evolution, Keith Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

It is common in the legal academy to describe trends in judicial decisions leading to new common law rules as the result of conscious judicial effort. Evolutionary models of litigation, in contrast, treat common law as resulting from pressure applied by litigants. One apparent difficulty in the theory of litigation is explaining how trends in judicial decisions favoring one litigant, and biasing the legal standard, could occur. This paper presents a model in which an apparent bias in the legal standard can occur in the absence of any effort toward this end on the part of judges. Trends can develop ...


Common Law Disclosure Duties And The Sin Of Omission: Testing The Meta-Theories, Kathryn Zeiler Jan 2005

Common Law Disclosure Duties And The Sin Of Omission: Testing The Meta-Theories, Kathryn Zeiler

Faculty Scholarship

Since ancient times, legal scholars have explored the vexing question of when and what a contracting party must disclose to her counterparty, even in the absence of explicit misleading statements. This fascination has culminated in a set of claims regarding which factors drive courts to impose disclosure duties on informed parties. Most of these claims are based on analysis of a small number of non-randomly selected cases and have not been tested systematically. This article represents the first attempt to systematically test a number of these claims using data coded from 466 case decisions spanning over a wide array of ...


The Economics Of Litigation And Arbitration: An Application To Franchise Contracts, Keith Hylton Jan 2003

The Economics Of Litigation And Arbitration: An Application To Franchise Contracts, Keith Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

If we define the deterrence benefits from contract enforcement as avoided harms net of avoidance costs, we should expect contracting parties to choose the dispute resolution forum that provides the greatest difference between deterrence benefits and dispute resolution costs for every type of dispute. We apply this general framework to franchise contracts and conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of arbitration agreements among franchising parties. Although it is obvious that contracting parties have an incentive to choose arbitration in order to reduce dispute-resolution costs, there have been no studies of the importance of deterrence concerns. We examine the deterrence ...


Controlling Opportunistic And Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, Michael Meurer Jan 2003

Controlling Opportunistic And Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, Michael Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

It is useful to think of intellectual property (IP) law both as a system of property rights that promotes the production of valuable information and as a system of government regulation that unintentionally promotes socially harmful rent-seeking. This Article analyzes methods of controlling rent-seeking costs associated with opportunistic and anti-competitive IP lawsuits. My thinking is guided to some extent by the analysis of procedural measures for controlling frivolous litigation, and analysis of antitrust reforms designed to control strategic abuse of antitrust law. These analogies lead me to focus on pre-trial and post-trial control measures that reduce the credibility of weak ...


An Asymmetric Information Model Of Litigation, Keith Hylton Jan 2000

An Asymmetric Information Model Of Litigation, Keith Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents a cradle-to-grave model of tort liability, incorporating the decision to comply with the due-care standard, the decision to file suit, and the decision to settle. I use the model primarily to examine settlement rates, plaintiff win rates, and compliance with the due-care standard. The key results of the modelare as follows: (1) litigation to judgment occurs only when some but not all actors comply with the due-care standard, and (2) if defendants have the information advantage at trial, plaintiff win rates generally will be less than fifty percent. I apply the model and its simulation results to ...