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Full-Text Articles in Law
Defining Dicta, Michael Abramowicz, Maxwell Stearns
Defining Dicta, Michael Abramowicz, Maxwell Stearns
George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series
In recent decades, legal scholars have devoted substantially greater attention to studying the origin and nature of stare decisis than to defining the distinction between holding and dicta. This appears counter-intuitive when one considers, first, that stare decisis applies only to holdings of announced precedents, and second, that beyond problematic and rudimentary intuitions, the legal system has failed to develop meaningful definitions of these terms. While lawyers, legal scholars, and jurists likely assume that they can identify dicta when they see it, a careful analysis that categorizes the range of judicial assertions in need of proper characterization reveals that defining …
Judges As Rulemakers, Larry A. Alexander, Emily Sherwin
Judges As Rulemakers, Larry A. Alexander, Emily Sherwin
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series
This essay analyzes and compares different approaches to the problem of legal precedent. If judges reasoned flawlessly, the ideal approach to precedent would give prior judicial opinions only the weight they naturally carry in moral reasoning. Given that judges are not perfect reasoners, the best approach to precedent is one that treats rules established in prior decisions as authoritative for later judges. In comparison to the natural model of precedent, a rule-based model minimizes error. A rule-based model is also superior to several popular attempts at compromise, which call on judges to reason from the results of prior cases or …
Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: An Empirical Investigation Of Ideology And Publication On The U.S. Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit, David S. Law
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series
Previous studies have demonstrated that, in a number of contexts, federal appeals court judges divide along ideological lines when deciding cases upon the merits. To date, however, researchers have failed to find evidence that circuit judges take advantage of selective publication rules to further their ideological preferences - for example, by voting more ideologically in published cases that have precedential effect than in unpublished cases that lack binding effect upon future panels. This article evaluates the possibility that judges engage in strategic judicial lawmaking by voting more ideologically in published cases than in unpublished cases. To test this hypothesis, all …
Supermajority Rules And The Judicial Confirmation Process, Michael B. Rappaport, John O. Mcginnis
Supermajority Rules And The Judicial Confirmation Process, Michael B. Rappaport, John O. Mcginnis
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series
In this paper we assess the effect of possible supermajority rules on the now contentious Senate confirmation process for judges. We deploy a formula for evaluating supermajority rules that we have developed in other papers. First, we consider a sixty-vote rule in the Senate for the confirmation of federal judges–an explicit version of the supermajority norm that may be emerging from the filibuster. While we briefly discuss how such a rule would affect the project of maximizing the number of originalist judges, for the most part we evaluate the rule on the realist assumption that judges will pursue their own …
Appointing Federal Judges: The President, The Senate, And The Prisoner's Dilemma, David S. Law
Appointing Federal Judges: The President, The Senate, And The Prisoner's Dilemma, David S. Law
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series
This paper argues that the expansion of the White House's role in judicial appointments since the late 1970s, at the expense of the Senate, has contributed to heightened levels of ideological conflict and gridlock over the appointment of federal appeals court judges, by making a cooperative equilibrium difficult to sustain. Presidents have greater electoral incentive to behave ideologically, and less incentive to cooperate with other players in the appointments process, than do senators, who are disciplined to a greater extent in their dealings with each other by the prospect of retaliation over repeat play. The possibility of divided government exacerbates …
Of Gift Horses And Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur In Administrative Law, Daniel B. Rodriguez
Of Gift Horses And Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur In Administrative Law, Daniel B. Rodriguez
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series
Administrative law has been shaped over the years by fundamentally practical considerations. Displacement of agency decisions by courts was rare; yet, the omnipresent threat of substantial judicial intrusion surely affected agency decisions. While the Administrative Procedure Act, adopted nearly 60 years ago, provides a comprehensive template for federal agency decisionmaking, what is striking about the APA is how much is left out and how much is left to the discretion of both agencies in implementing regulatory decisions and to the courts in superintending agency action. Given this history, it is hardly surprising that many doctrinal techniques represent the pragmatic effort …