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The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court At The Bar Of Mathematics, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen Jan 1996

The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court At The Bar Of Mathematics, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

We analyze the relative voting power of the Justices based upon Supreme Court decisions during October Term 1994 and October Term 1995. We take two approaches, both based on ideas derived from cooperative game theory. One of the measures we use has been used in connection with voting rights cases. After naming the Most Dangerous Justice, we conclude by identifying and explaining the inverse relationship between seniority and voting power.


"Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts About The Supremes As The Sultans Of Swing, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen Jan 1996

"Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts About The Supremes As The Sultans Of Swing, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

We respond to Professor Lynn A. Baker's criticisms of our article, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics. Professor Baker fundamentally misunderstands our measure of Supreme Court voting power. Moreover, she erroneously presumes that the "median Justice" wields the bulk of the Court's power. Even if there were a median Justice, it is far from clear whether he would be the Most Dangerous Justice. We conclude with a clarification of the median voter theorem and its implications for the distribution of voting power within the Supreme Court.