Law Commons^™

Confrontation, The Legacy Of Crawford, And Important Unanswered Questions, Paul F. Rothstein, Ronald J. Coleman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This is a short piece for the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform as part of its 2024 Symposium on “Crawford at 20: Reforming the Confrontation Clause.” The piece's purpose is to highlight certain important questions left unanswered by Crawford v. Washington and subsequent confrontation cases.

The Future Scope Of The Character Evidence Prohibition: The Contextual Statutory Construction Argument That Could Finally Force The Policy Discussion, Paul F. Rothstein, Edward J. Imwinkelried

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The general prohibition of character evidence is one of the most important doctrines in American Evidence law. Since the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment forbids status offenses in adult prosecutions, the doctrine has constitutional overtones. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) applies the prohibition to evidence of an accused’s other crimes and wrongs. Since such evidence can be inflammatory and the Rule’s limits sometimes confusing, Rule 404(b) generates more published opinions than any other provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Although the prohibition extends beyond other crimes, most of the controversy swirls around the Rule’s application to …

Confronting Memory Loss, Paul F. Rothstein, Ronald J. Coleman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment grants “the accused” in “all criminal prosecutions” a right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” A particular problem occurs when there is a gap in time between the testimony that is offered, and the cross-examination of it, as where, pursuant to a hearsay exception or exemption, evidence of a current witness’s prior statement is offered and for some intervening reason her current memory is impaired. Does this fatally affect the opportunity to “confront” the witness? The Supreme Court has, to date, left unclear the extent to which a memory-impaired witness can …

Probability, Presumptions And Evidentiary Burdens In Antitrust Analysis: Revitalizing The Rule Of Reason For Exclusionary Conduct, Andrew I. Gavil, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The conservative critique of antitrust law has been highly influential and has facilitated a transformation of antitrust standards of conduct since the 1970s and led to increasingly more permissive standards of conduct. While these changes have taken many forms, all were influenced by the view that competition law was over-deterrent. Critics relied heavily on the assumption that the durability and costs of false positive errors far exceeded those of false negatives.

Many of the assumptions that guided this retrenchment of antitrust rules were mistaken and advances in the law and in economic analysis have rendered them anachronistic, particularly with respect …

A Game Of Katso And Mouse: Current Theories For Getting Forensic Analysis Evidence Past The Confrontation Clause, Ronald J. Coleman, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause ensures that an “accused” in a “criminal prosecution[]” has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him [.]” Although perhaps a simple concept, defining the scope of confrontation rights has proved extremely difficult. The law has had particular difficulty scoping confrontation rights in forensic analysis cases, such as those where the prosecution seeks to utilize a laboratory report of DNA, blood alcohol content, narcotics, or other “CSI” type analysis. In this connection, Justice Gorsuch recently authored an opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari in Stuart v. Alabama, in which he recognized the …

Response Essay: Some Observations On Professor Schwartz's "Foundation" Theory Of Evidence, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Professor David Schwartz's A Foundation Theory of Evidence posits an intriguing new way to look at Evidence. It asserts that offered evidence must meet a tripartite requirement before it can be relevant. The tripartite requirement is that the evidence must be "case-specific, assertive, and probably true." His shorthand for the tripartite requirement is that evidence must be "well founded." Hence, he calls his theory the "foundation theory of evidence" and claims this foundation notion is so central to evidence law that it eclipses in importance even relevance itself. The tripartite requirement inheres in the very concept of evidence and relevancy, …

Williams V. Illinois And The Confrontation Clause: Does Testimony By A Surrogate Witness Violate The Confrontation Clause?, Paul F. Rothstein, Ronald J. Coleman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article comprises a four-part debate between Paul Rothstein, Professor of Law at Georgetown Law Center, and Ronald J. Coleman, who works in the litigation practice group at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, on Williams v. Illinois, a Supreme Court case that involves the Confrontation Clause, which entitles a criminal defendant to confront an accusing witness in court. The issue at hand is whether said clause is infringed when a report not introduced into evidence at trial is used by an expert to testify about the results of testing that has been conducted by a non-testifying third party. …

Teaching Evidence, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article was published as part of the 2006 teaching issue of the Saint Louis University Law Journal. The teaching series was created as a forum for scholars, judges, and students to discuss methods for the effective teaching and learning of particular law school courses. In this essay, Professor Rothstein describes his philosophy and methods for teaching evidence.

"Anything You Say May Be Used Against You": A Proposed Seminar On The Lawyer’S Duty To Warn Of Confidentiality’S Limits In Today's Post-Enron World, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In light of recent developments, the confidence that one's communications with a lawyer will remain sacrosanct today may be badly misplaced. This raises important questions concerning the duty of lawyers: When, to what extent, and in what detail, does an attorney communicating with someone who may expect confidentiality, have a duty to explain in advance the circumstances under which the information gained may subsequently be revealed pursuant to these or other confidentiality loopholes? Will the interviewee “clam up” in the face of such Miranda-like warnings? If so, what does this do to the premise of Upjohn and the Model Rule …

Doctrinal Issues In Evidence And Proof, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The word evidence ordinarily means the statements, events, items, or sensory perceptions that suggest the existence or nonexistence of, or truth or falsity of, another fact. Thus, one may say, “hoofbeats are evidence a horse may be passing.” Proof is similar in meaning but may connote more certainty.

Evidence can also mean the study of either (1) how people make such inferences (especially when conjoined with the word proof) or (2) how law regulates information admissibility in the judicial context. Evidence in the latter sense is the name of a standard law school course in common law countries and a …

The Second Circuit And The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The most significant development in federal trial procedure in recent years has been the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, effective July 1, 1975. In the intervening two years since the Rules became effective, the courts of the Second Circuit have bad occasion to make several illuminating applications of and references to them.

An examination of some of these decisions provides insight into the kinds of questions that are coming up not only in the Second Circuit, but around the country, and the kinds of answers that are being given. It is not the bizarre or unusual case that …

Some Themes In The Proposed Federal Rules Of Evidence, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Although the Federal Rules of Evidence are under consideration by Congress, it is unlikely that many of their major themes will be reversed. The present article examines some of these themes as they appear in the Supreme Court-approved draft. The aim is merely to make more explicit the effects of the Rules and suggest some questions for study.

The Second Circuit Review: Ix. Evidence: Introduction, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The past year's developments in the law of evidence have been characterized by a hardening attitude toward criminal defendants. The United States Supreme Court's evidentiary rulings during the term covered by the Second Circuit Review (1971-72) manifested this trend (although not uniformly). For example, police stop-and-frisk authority was broadened (and with it the use of evidence obtained therefrom); the scope of the immunity from criminal prosecution required to be granted by a governmental body before self-incriminatory statements can be compelled from a witness was narrowed; the right to have counsel at line-ups was limited to postindictment or post-charge line-ups (with …

A Re-Evaluation Of The Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony In The Light Of Its Purpose, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The recent development in American federal criminal evidence law to be examined and compared with English law in this paper, is a new evolutionary turn taken by the husband-wife privilege against adverse spousal testimony, manifest in the Supreme Court decision of Wyatt v. United States. The House of Lords, in Rumping v. D.P.P., just decided, suggests that the English spousal privileges might be susceptible of similar development.