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Full-Text Articles in Law
Comparative Analysis Of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries
Comparative Analysis Of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, Continental rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.
Bank Entry During The Antebellum Period, Andrew J. Economopoulos, Heather M. O'Neill
Bank Entry During The Antebellum Period, Andrew J. Economopoulos, Heather M. O'Neill
Business and Economics Faculty Publications
A recent study by Kenneth Ng (1988) challenges the view that free banking laws lowered barriers to entry. The authors' study examines bank entry and capital formation in free and nonfree banking states during the free banking period. A competitive model is developed and used to test if barriers were lowered in free banking states. The evidence indicates that entry significantly increased after the enactment of the free banking laws and that entry policy in nonfree banking states appeared to have been 'liberalized' when the free banking laws were enacted in other states.