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Full-Text Articles in Law
Duality In Contract And Tort, Tim Friehe, Joshua C. Teitelbaum
Duality In Contract And Tort, Tim Friehe, Joshua C. Teitelbaum
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
We study situations in which a single investment serves the dual role of increasing the expected value of a contract (a reliance investment) and reducing the expected harm of a post-performance accident (a care investment). We show that failing to account for the duality of the investment leads to inefficient damages for breach of contract and inefficient standards for due care in tort. Conversely, we show that accounting for the duality yields contract damage measures and tort liability rules that provide correct incentives for efficient breach and reliance in contract and for efficient care in tort.
Converse-Osborn: State Sovereign Immunity, Standing, And The Dog-Wagging Effect Of Article Iii, Carlos Manuel Vázquez
Converse-Osborn: State Sovereign Immunity, Standing, And The Dog-Wagging Effect Of Article Iii, Carlos Manuel Vázquez
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
“[T]he legislative, executive, and judicial powers, of every well-constructed government, are co-extensive with each other . . . [T]he judicial department may receive from the Legislature the power of construing any . . . law [which the Legislature may constitutionally make].” Chief Justice Marshall relied on this axiom in Osborn v. Bank of the United States to stress the breadth of the federal judicial power: The federal courts must have the potential power to adjudicate any claim based on any law Congress has the power to enact. In recent years, however, the axiom has sometimes operated in the opposite direction: …