Law Commons^™

Amending Corporate Charters And Bylaws, Albert H. Choi, Geeyoung Min

All Faculty Scholarship

Recently, courts have embraced the contractarian theory that corporate charters and bylaws constitute a “contract” between the shareholders and the corporation and have been more willing to uphold bylaws unilaterally adopted by the directors. This paper examines the contractarian theory by drawing a parallel between amending charters and bylaws, on the one hand, and amending contracts, on the other. In particular, the paper compares the right to unilaterally amend corporate bylaws with the right to unilaterally modify contract terms, and highlights how contract law imposes various limitations on the modifying party’s discretion. More generally, when the relationship of contracting parties …

Selling It First, Stealing It Later: The Trouble With Trademarks In Corporate Transactions In Bankruptcy, Xuan-Thao Nguyen

Articles

Why does AI get two bites of the “Apple” trademark? Should AI be allowed to grant the right to use the trademark “perpetual and exclusive” with the sale of the music division and steal it back for free, ten years later? This article is part of an ongoing and broader inquiry into the intersection of trademark, contract and bankruptcy laws. This article argues that recent bankruptcy decisional law, notably the In re Exide Technologies decision, misunderstands the “perpetual and exclusive” trademark transaction, deeming it as an ordinary “license” when it is truly an outright sale. This article explains that the …

On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow

Articles

It was once perceived, and still is commonly taught, that default rules in contract law must mimic efficient arrangements. Otherwise, these rules impose needless transaction costs upon parties who seek to opt out of them to reach more efficient positions. In settings where these costs are high, parties might find themselves "stuck" in a default, unable to reach the outcome that they prefer. The strong version of this account-that the only factor that can make an inefficient default rule stick is the direct cost of drafting a tailored provision-has been gradually reappraised. It is by now recognized that factors beyond …

Section 365 In The Consumer Context: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, Michael G. Hillinger, Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger

Faculty Publications

The § 365 consumer debtor case law has a further complication. Much of it arises in the context of the last great bankruptcy frontier, Chapter 13. Until recently, Chapter 11 has occupied the minds and hearts of courts and attorneys. Not any more. And, as attorneys and courts take a closer, harder look at Chapter 13, it is no longer possible to describe it as a “streamlined creditors-can’t-vote Chapter 11”. Chapter 13 is unique, presenting its very own quandaries, not the least of which is how its provisions and § 365 interact. We live in interesting times.

Wasted Water: The Problems And Promise Of Improving Efficiency Under Western Water Law, Steven J. Shupe

Colorado Water Issues and Options: The 90's and Beyond: Toward Maximum Beneficial Use of Colorado's Water Resources (October 8)

61 pages.

Includes footnotes (pages 49-56).