Law Commons^™

Contract Creep, Tal Kastner, Ethan J. Leib

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars and judges think they can address the multiple purposes and values of contract law by developing different doctrinal regimes for different transaction types. They think if we develop one track of contract doctrine for sophisticated parties and another for consumers, we can build a better world of contract: protecting private ordering for sophisticated parties and protecting consumers’ needs all at once. Given the growing enthusiasm for laying down these separate tracks and developing their infrastructures, this Article brings a necessary reality check to this endeavor by highlighting for scholars and judges how doctrine in contract law functions in fact: …

Contract Creep, Tal Kastner, Ethan J. Leib

Scholarly Works

Scholars and judges think they can address the multiple purposes and values of contract law by developing different doctrinal regimes for different transaction types. They think if we develop one track of contract doctrine for sophisticated parties and another for consumers, we can build a better world of contract: protecting private ordering for sophisticated parties and protecting consumers’ needs all at once. Given the growing enthusiasm for laying down these separate tracks and developing their infrastructures, this Article brings a necessary reality check to this endeavor by highlighting for scholars and judges how doctrine in contract law functions in fact: …

Boilerplate And Economic Power In Auto-Manufacturing Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar, James J. White

Book Chapters

This chapter examines the boilerplate contracts used by auto makers to procure parts from suppliers. It identifies drafting and negotiation techniques that are used to secure advantageous terms. It also explores some prominent specific arrangements as evidence that firms with bargaining power are exploiting their position to dictate self-serving but inefficient terms. Finally, it shows how standard contractual clauses solve the problem of ex-post hold-up by suppliers.

Preface: Or: A Boilerplate Introduction, Omri Ben-Shahar

Book Chapters

It is tempting to open this volume with yet another "boilerplate" salute to the challenge that standard-form contracts pose for contract law doctrine. You may have seen many tributes to this fundamental problem. Ifi were to offer my own variation on this familiar introduction, I would have perhaps tried to come up with an original spin to induce you to read forward another paragraph or two. I would probably have talked about a major divide within contract law between the "law of negotiations" and "product regulation." The former is the body of doctrines that determine the legal consequences of bargaining …

Got Wheels? Article 2a, Standardized Rental Car Terms, Rational Inaction, And Unilateral Private Ordering, Irma S. Russell

Faculty Law Review Articles

This article considers the system of unilateral private ordering by form contracts: the presumptions of a free market and free bargaining. It questions whether the system of constrained judicial oversight that serves to insulate bargaining from governmental control should extend to standardized consumer contracts that emphatically dispense with bilateral ordering. It also questions whether the unilateral private ordering presented by standardized contracts effects a cost savings for society, a construct with apparently universal acceptance today. This article considers the application of Article 2A to standard form contracts in the most common consumer leasing transaction -- renting a car.

Part II …

Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2 (Symposium: Consumer Protection And The Uniform Commercial Code), James J. White

Articles

The current draft of section 2-206 in Revised Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") entitled "Consumer Contract: Standard Form"1 presents a unique and threatening challenge to the drafters of consumer form contracts. In earlier drafts, one part of the section applied to both to commercial contracts and consumer contracts. It required that "one manifest assent" to any form contract, commercial or consumer, in order for it to be binding.2 Bowing to commercial opposition in the most recent version, the drafters have omitted all reference to commercial contracts. As the section stands, it applies only to consumer contracts.

The Reunification Of Contract: The Objective Theory Of Consumer Form Contracts, Michael I. Meyerson

All Faculty Scholarship

Despite the ubiquitousness of standard form contracts in the world of consumer transactions, there is no consensus as to how these contracts ought to be constructed. Some courts continue to treat form contracts as if they were classically negotiated contracts. Others attempt in a variety of ways to factor in the reality that consumers entering into these contracts are not able to negotiate the terms and almost always sign these documents, which are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, without reading them. This article posits that the cause of this continued confusion over form contracts is due to a basic failure …