Law Commons^™

More Contract Lore, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Contract lore consists of “traditional beliefs” about contract law that judges, lawyers, and scholars applying and writing about contract law, employ so routinely and confidently that the principles demonstrate how we perceive contract law today. Previously, I presented three illustrations of contract lore: First, expectancy damages put the injured party in as good a position as if there were no breach. Second, the reasons for a breach, “whether willful, negligent, or unavoidable, are irrelevant to the rules of performance and remedies.” Third, contract formation and interpretation focus on the parties’ intentions.

None of these principles are factually or historically even …

The Future Of Fault In Contract Law, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

According to judicial opinions, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and some analysts, the reasons for failing to perform a contract, whether willful, negligent, or unavoidable, have little or no bearing in determining contract liability. Contract liability is said to be “strict,” meaning that the reasons for nonperformance are irrelevant in determining the injured party’s rights. In this Article, I argue that the reasons for failing to perform, which focus on whether non-performance is the promisor’s fault, are crucially important in the resolution of many, perhaps most disputes under contract law.

The Productive Tension Between Official And Unofficial Stories Of Fault In Contract Law, Martha M. Ertman

Faculty Scholarship

Officially Contract law ignores fault. However, an unofficial story complements the official one, and explains why fault occasionally slips into contract law through doctrines such as willful breach. This chapter of FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porot, eds, Cambridge U. Press, forthcoming 2010) argues that the official and unofficial stories operate in productive tension to both facilitate ex ante planning and, when necessary, look backward at reasons for breach to reach a just result. The occasional presence of fault in contract law, in this view, represents merely one more instance of the common doctrinal pattern of …

Partially Odious Debts?, Omri Ben-Shahar, Mitu Gulati

Articles

The despotic ruler of a poor nation borrows extensively from foreign creditors. He spends some of those funds on building statues of himself, others on buying arms for his brutal secret police, and he places the remainder in his personal bank accounts in Switzerland. The longer the despot stays in power, the poorer the nation becomes. Although the secret police are able to keep prodemocracy protests subdued by force for many years, eventually there is a popular revolt. The despot flees the scene with a few billion dollars of his illgotten gains. The populist regime that replaces the despot now …