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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Best Of Times And The Worst Of Times: The Current Landscape Of Mandatory Arbitration Clause Enforcement In Domestic Arbitration, Virginia Neisler Feb 2019

The Best Of Times And The Worst Of Times: The Current Landscape Of Mandatory Arbitration Clause Enforcement In Domestic Arbitration, Virginia Neisler

Law Librarian Scholarship

There is nothing new about arbi­tration, a method of alternative dispute resolution designed to settle disputes more efficiently, cheaper, and faster than litigation. Today, mandatory arbitration clauses are ubiquitous in commercial contracts, social media terms and conditions, employment contracts, and more. These contracts, where one party in the weaker position (often a consumer or an employee) must either accept or reject the terms as written with no power to negotiate, are known as contracts of adhesion. The widespread use of arbitration clauses—specifically, pre­dispute, forced arbitration agreements, often including class­action waiv ers found in adhesion contracts—has come under pressure.


College Football Coaches' Pay And Contracts: Are They Overpaid And Unduly Privileged?, Randall S. Thomas, R. Lawrence Van Horn Jan 2016

College Football Coaches' Pay And Contracts: Are They Overpaid And Unduly Privileged?, Randall S. Thomas, R. Lawrence Van Horn

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

College football coaches' employment contracts and compensation garner public attention and scrutiny in much the same way as those of corporate CEOs. In both cases, the public perception is that they must be overpaid and pampered Economic theory claims that for coaches and CEOs to be overpaid, they must be receiving compensation in excess of the value they create for their organizations. However, both receive pay-for-performance compensation, which structurally aligns their compensation with value creation. This means we need to examine the underlying structure of the contract that gives rise to the observed compensation to determine whether they are appropriately …


An Empirical Analysis Of Noncompetition Clauses And Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, Randall Thomas Jan 2015

An Empirical Analysis Of Noncompetition Clauses And Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, Randall Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Employment contracts for most employees are not publicly available, leaving researchers to speculate about whether they contain postemployment restrictions on employee mobility, and if so, what those provisions look like. Using a large sample of publicly available CEO employment contracts, we are able to examine these noncompetition covenants, including postemployment covenants not to compete ("CNCs" or "noncompetes'), nonsolicitation agreements ("NSAs"), and nondisclosure agreements ("NDAs'). What we found confirms some long-held assumptions about restrictive covenants but also uncovers some surprises.

We begin by discussing why employers use restrictive covenants and examining how the courts have treated them. We then analyze an …


Parallel Contract, Aditi Bagchi Feb 2012

Parallel Contract, Aditi Bagchi

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article describes a new model of contract. In parallel contract, one party enters into a series of contracts with many similarly situated individuals on background terms that are presumptively identical. Parallel contracts depart from the classical model of contract in two fundamental ways. First, obligations are not robustly dyadic in that they are neither tailored to the two parties to a given agreement nor understood by those parties by way of communications with each other. Second, obligations are not fixed at a discrete moment of contract. Parallel contracts should be interpreted differently than agreements more consistent with the classic …


Comparing Ceo Employment Contract Provisions: Differences Between Australia And The United States, Randall Thomas, Jennifer G. Hill, Ronald W. Masulis Jan 2011

Comparing Ceo Employment Contract Provisions: Differences Between Australia And The United States, Randall Thomas, Jennifer G. Hill, Ronald W. Masulis

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The results of our comparison of U.S. and Australian contracts offer some interesting contrasts with several earlier studies that compare U.S. and U.K. CEO compensation. In those prior studies, the authors conclude that U.S. CEOs' compensation is significantly higher than U.K. CEOs' compensation. What is interesting about our initial results is that U.S. CEOs clearly do not have higher base salaries in comparison to Australia. On the other hand, U.S. contracts are much more likely to include restricted stock and stock option features, which generally require payment after a CEO remains at the firm a fixed number of years, typically …


Separating Contract And Promise, Aditi Bagchi Sep 2007

Separating Contract And Promise, Aditi Bagchi

All Faculty Scholarship

Contract has been conceptualized as a species of promise. Treating contractual promise as a kind of promise highlights certain important aspects of contracting, but it also obscures essential differences between legally binding and everyday, or what I will call “private,” promises. The moral character of a private promise depends on the fact that it is not only freely made but also freely kept. Most contractual promises are not intended to have and (by definition) do not have this voluntary character. A promisor essentially opts out of the private practice of promising when she assigns to a third party the authority …


Bearded Ladies Walking On The Brooklyn Bridge, David G. Epstein Jan 2006

Bearded Ladies Walking On The Brooklyn Bridge, David G. Epstein

Law Faculty Publications

This article discusses the post-Restatement Second use, misuse, and abuse of the terms "bilateral contract" and "unilateral contract" and answers the hypotheticals in the first paragraphs of the article.


On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow Jan 2006

On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow

Articles

It was once perceived, and still is commonly taught, that default rules in contract law must mimic efficient arrangements. Otherwise, these rules impose needless transaction costs upon parties who seek to opt out of them to reach more efficient positions. In settings where these costs are high, parties might find themselves "stuck" in a default, unable to reach the outcome that they prefer. The strong version of this account-that the only factor that can make an inefficient default rule stick is the direct cost of drafting a tailored provision-has been gradually reappraised. It is by now recognized that factors beyond …


The Unfulfilled Promise Of Promissory Estoppel In The Employment Setting, Robert A. Hillman Oct 1999

The Unfulfilled Promise Of Promissory Estoppel In The Employment Setting, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Although the theory of promissory estoppel enforces promises that induce reasonable detrimental reliance, this article reveals the theory's colossal failure in the non-union employment setting. This conclusion is based on an examination of all of the reported decisions in the United States that discussed promissory estoppel over a two-year period in the mid 1990's. During this period, employees won only 4.23 percent of employment promissory estoppel cases decided on the merits. At first blush, this is very surprising because employers, through their communications, seek to create the expectation of a stable, secure work environment and employees, because of their lack …


Policing Employment Contracts Within The Nexus-Of-Contracts Firm, Katherine V.W. Stone Jul 1993

Policing Employment Contracts Within The Nexus-Of-Contracts Firm, Katherine V.W. Stone

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.