Law Commons^™

Governing Land Investments: Do Governments Have Legal Support Gaps?, Sam Szoke-Burke, Kaitlin Y. Cordes

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In the wave of efforts to encourage and support more “responsible” land investments, one aspect has been largely overlooked: are governments equipped with the legal and technical support needed to effectively negotiate and conclude investment contracts that lead to responsible outcomes?

CCSI researched how host governments access legal support in the planning, negotiation, and monitoring of land investments, with a view to better understanding where legal support gaps for governments exist, and how these can be addressed by governments themselves, as well as by donors, support providers and investors.

By scrutinizing “legal support gaps,” CCSI sought to identify possible weak …

Governing Land Investments: Do Governments Have Legal Support Gaps?, Sam Szoke-Burke, Kaitlin Y. Cordes

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In the wave of efforts to encourage and support more “responsible” land investments, one aspect has been largely overlooked: are governments equipped with the legal and technical support needed to effectively negotiate and conclude investment contracts that lead to responsible outcomes?

CCSI researched how host governments access legal support in the planning, negotiation, and monitoring of land investments, with a view to better understanding where legal support gaps for governments exist, and how these can be addressed by governments themselves, as well as by donors, support providers and investors.

By scrutinizing “legal support gaps,” CCSI sought to identify possible weak …

Boilerplate And Economic Power In Auto-Manufacturing Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar, James J. White

Book Chapters

This chapter examines the boilerplate contracts used by auto makers to procure parts from suppliers. It identifies drafting and negotiation techniques that are used to secure advantageous terms. It also explores some prominent specific arrangements as evidence that firms with bargaining power are exploiting their position to dictate self-serving but inefficient terms. Finally, it shows how standard contractual clauses solve the problem of ex-post hold-up by suppliers.

The Search Interest In Contract, Joshua A.T. Fairfield

Scholarly Articles

Parties often do not negotiate for contract terms. Instead, parties search for the products, terms, and contractual counterparties they desire. The traditional negotiation centered view of contract continues to lead courts to try to construe the meaning of the parties where no meaning was negotiated, and to waste time determining the benefits of bargains that were never struck. Further, while courts have ample tools to validate specifically negotiated contract terms, courts lack the tools to respond to searched-for terms. Although the law and literature have long recognized that there is a disconnect between the legal fictions of negotiation and the …

Comment: On Contractual Defaults And Experimental Law And Economics, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

It is possible that contract default rules, whose relevance is contingent upon parties' agreement to contract, differ from other default states. Parties therefore might not perceive contingent contractual defaults as relevant reference points. Ironically, however, Sloof, Oosterbeek and Sonnemans' (SOS) "default contract" applied inevitably whenever proposed and whenever Respondents rejected a non-default proposal, bearing greater resemblance to a legal right than to a contractual default. Thus, the contingency of typical contractual defaults cannot account for the No Bias Finding. Other aspects of the SOS experimental design, on the other hand, may explain the No Bias Finding.