Law Commons^™

"Boilerplate": An Introduction, Omri Ben-Shahar

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

This short essay introduces the themes that are developed in twelve articles that were delivered recently in a symposium on “Boilerplate: Foundations of Market Contracts” at the University of Michigan Law School. The proceeding of the symposium will be published in Volume 104 of the Michigan Law Review.

Boilerplate And Economic Power In Auto Manufacturing Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar, James J. White

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

This article studies the standard form contracts used by automobile manufacturers to purchase auto parts. It explores how the contracts reflect divisions of bargaining power, asymmetric information, problems of hold-up and renegotiation, and market competition. Based on interviews with representatives of buyers and suppliers, the article also describes the process of drafting the forms, the negotiation over price and other terms in the shadow of these forms, and the opportunities for non-drafters to extract improved terms. Some of the main lessons are: (i) The terms of the contracts and the bidding process prevent ex-post hold-up by suppliers (in contrast to …

Is Forum-Shopping Corrupting America's Bankruptcy Courts? Review Of Lynn M. Lopucki, "Courting Failure: How Competition For Big Cases Is Corrupting The Bankruptcy Courts", Todd J. Zywicki

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

In his new book, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts, Professor Lynn LoPucki’s book argues that that current bankruptcy venue rules have spawned an improper “competition for big cases” that has “corrupted” America’s bankruptcy courts. LoPucki argues that this competition has harmed the bankruptcy system and the economy, transferring wealth from creditors and employees to incumbent management and bankruptcy professionals. He also argues that the competition that has corrupted the American bankruptcy system is being replicated internationally, resulting in a similar competition and similar harm on the global stage.

This essay reviews LoPucki’s book …

The Comparative Law And Economics Of Pure Economic Loss, Francesco Parisi, Vernon Valentine Palmer, Mauro Bussani

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Law and economics shows that a key factor in determining the optimal economic loss rule is found in the relationship between pure economic loss and social loss. Economic loss should be compensable in torts only to the extent that it corresponds to a socially relevant loss. In this paper we undertake a comparative evaluation of the economic loss rule to verify whether modern legal systems, although not formally adopting the economic criterion, define the exclusionary rule in light of efficiency considerations. The comparative analysis reveals that the substantive applications of the economic loss rule in European jurisdictions are consistent with …

Pre-Contractual Obligations In France And The United States, Florence Caterini

LLM Theses and Essays

This thesis compares the pre-contractual obligations in France and the United States. The focus of this study is to analyze how both legal systems deal with these pre-contractual obligations. It focuses on the possibilities given to the parties to protect themselves during the negotiation process. In event of breach of negotiations, the law gives legal remedies to the parties. French and American laws have a different analysis of the problem but they reach similar result: liability under contract law when a contract has been formed or a tentative agreement, or under tort law when no agreement whatsoever has been reached.

Should Liability Play A Role In The Social Control Of Biobanks?, Larry I. Palmer

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

On-Line Consumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A Survey And Discussion Of Legal Implications, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In a recent article, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (2002), Jeffery Rachlinski and I analyzed whether contract law's approach to the problem of paper standard forms can effectively govern electronic forms. We thought the rational and cognitive reasons consumers fail to read their paper forms apply in the e-environment. Further, although e-consumers do not face manipulative sales agents or impatient customers waiting in line but, instead, largely contract at home in the evening without time constraints, e-consumers are impatient, even click happy, and therefore still do not read their forms or shop for the …

Institutions, Incentives, And Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, Todd Zywicki

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Consumer bankruptcy filing rates have soared during the past 25 years. From 225,000 filings in 1979, consumer bankruptcies topped 1.5 million during 2004. This relentless upward trend is striking in light of the generally high prosperity, low interest rates, and low unemployment during that period. This anomaly of ever-upward bankruptcy filing rates during a period of economic prosperity had spurred calls to reform the Bankruptcy Code to place new conditions on bankruptcy relief. Although bankruptcy reform has drawn broad bipartisan support on Capitol Hill, these proposals have proven controversial within the academy. Critics have argued that these reforms are unnecessary …

On Discovering Doctrine: "Justice" In Contract Agreement, Peter A. Alces

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Corporations And Autonomy Theories Of Contract: A Critique Of The New Lex Mercatoria, Nathan B. Oman

Faculty Publications

One of the central problems of contracts jurisprudence is the conflict between autonomy theories of contract and efficiency theories of contract. One approach to solving this conflict is to argue that in the realm of contracts between corporations, autonomy theories have nothing to say because corporations are not real people with whose autonomy we need to be concerned. While apparently powerful, this argument ultimately fails because it implicitly assumes theories of the corporation at odds with economic theories of law. Economics, in turn, offers a vision of the firm that is quite hospitable to autonomy theories of contract. The failure …

Losing Rights To Intellectual Property: The Perils Of Contracting With The Federal Government, Katherine White

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

Rediscovering Williston, Mark L. Movsesian

Faculty Publications

This Article is an intellectual history of classical contracts scholar Samuel Williston. Professor Movsesian argues that the conventional account of Williston's jurisprudence presents an incomplete and distorted picture. While much of Williston's work can strike a contemporary reader as arid and conceptual, there are strong elements of pragmatism as well. Williston insists that doctrine be justified in terms of real-world consequences, maintains that rules can have only presumptive force, and offers institutional explanations for judicial restraint. As a result, his scholarship shares more in common with today's new formalism than commonly supposed. Even the under-theorized quality of Williston's scholarship—to contemporary …

Joseph Baxendale, James J. Fishman

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

The defendant in the great case of Hadley v. Baxendale is Joseph Baxendale, managing partner of Pickford and Co., the common carrier that delayed the delivery of the Hadley's shaft. Baxendale was named the defendant, because Pickfords was a partnership and did not incorporate until 1901. Joseph Baxendale was born in 1785, the son of a Lancastershire surgeon. In 1806, he moved to London, where he worked for a wholesale linen draper. Later, he became a partner in that firm, and developed the managerial and accounting skills that would serve him so well at Pickfords.

Estudio Comparativo De La Formacion De Contratos Electronicos En El Derecho Estadounidense Con Referencia Al Derecho International Y Al Derecho Mexicano, Roberto Rosas

Faculty Articles

The author presents the underlying fundamental contractual principles in American law, and in this respect, tire Uniform Commercial Code, with particular emphasis in how electronic transactions are regulating, and therefore in the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act. Concerning international law, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and concerning Mexican law, with reference to the Commerce Code and the Federal Civil Code.

Unhappy Contracts: The Case Of Divorce Settlements, Margaret F. Brinig

Journal Articles

This paper examines a particular type of contracts that is, sadly, increasingly frequent: the agreements produced by divorcing couples. They are unhappy contracts, agreements produced as a necessary part of exit from what is now suboptimal marriage. They are virtually required by many states and are, in theory at least, closely monitored by courts since, when children are involved, they will be incorporated into court orders.What parties to unhappy contracts do is attempt to minimize losses, rather than maximize gain. How are contracts structured that will do this, and how does a difference in the size or power of the …

Unity And Pluralism In Contract Law, Nathan B. Oman

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Symposium - Incomplete Contracts: Judicial Responses, Transactional Planning, And Litigation Strategies - Introduction, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Faculty Publications

This introduction introduces three articles in a Symposium by Richard Craswell, Avery Katz, Robert Scott and George Triantis on the topic of incomplete contracts. The Symposium appears in 56 CASE WES. L. REV. 135 (2005).

The recognition that parties will often fail to achieve completely contingent contracts that provide for an optimal outcome in any future state of the world raises the important question of what role courts could or should play in such contracts.

Scholars working in the law-and-economics tradition have suggested that courts should use a hypothetical bargain approach to incompleteness, filling in terms that are optimal (efficient) …

Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, And Collaboration: The End Of The Legal Profession And The Beginning Of Professional Pluralism, Scott R. Peppet

Publications

This Article combines contractarian economics and traditional ethical theory to argue for a radical revision of the legal profession's codes of ethics. That revision would end the legal profession as we know it-one profession, regulated by one set of ethical rules that apply to all lawyers regardless of circumstance. It would replace the existing uniform conception of the lawyer's role with a more heterogeneous profession in which lawyers and clients could contractually choose the ethical obligations under which they wanted to operate. This "contract model" of legal ethics, in which lawyers could opt in and out of various ethical constraints, …

Common-Law Disclosure Duties And The Sin Of Omission: Testing The Meta-Theories, Kathryn Zeiler, Kimberly D. Krawiec

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article represents the first attempt to study empirically the factors that cause courts to impose disclosure duties on bargaining parties in some circumstances, but not in others. We analyze data coded from 466 decisions spanning a wide array of jurisdictions and covering over two hundred years. The results are mixed. In some instances our data support the conventional wisdom relating to common-law disclosure duties. For example, we find that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of latent, as opposed to patent, defects and are more likely to require disclosure when the parties are in a fiduciary or …

The Microfoundations Of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination Vs. Behavioral Bias, Jonathan Klick

All Faculty Scholarship

Standard form contracts, or contracts of adhesion, appear to provide contradictory evidence for the operation of bargaining in the markets where they are common. Non-negotiated contract terms that seemingly benefit sellers to the detriment of buyers call into question the efficiency implications of the Coase Theorem, which forms the foundation of positive law and economics. Proponents of the behavioral school of law and economics have suggested that behavioral biases, observed in experimental contexts, provide the most plausible explanation for standard form contracts. However, price discrimination might provide a more parsimonious explanation for abusive terms in contracts. If there is heterogeneity …