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Full-Text Articles in Law

Enforcing Coasian Bribes For Non-Price Benefits: A New Role For Restitution, Wendy J. Gordon, Tamar Frankel Sep 1994

Enforcing Coasian Bribes For Non-Price Benefits: A New Role For Restitution, Wendy J. Gordon, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

In Boomer v. Muir,1 a subcontractor on a hydroelectric project continued to provide goods and services even though the value of the performance far exceeded the contract price. The general contractor, who was receiving these goods and services, breached the contract even though he was paying less than market price for them.2

In many states, a supplier in the subcontractor's position has among her options the choice of "rescission and restitution."3 That means the supplier may rescind the contract and seek, under the label of "restitution", payment set at market price (or at her cost)4 for …


The Power Of Presumptions, Randy E. Barnett Jan 1994

The Power Of Presumptions, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Once you start to notice it, you see it everywhere. Burden-shifting is pervasive.The author began to notice the power of presumptions when examining how to protect the rights "retained by the people" referred to in the Ninth Amendment without having to enumerate each one. He proposed the creation of a "presumption of liberty" that would extend the same protective presumption now accorded freedom of speech to all other rightful exercises of liberty. This presumption would shift the burden to the government to justify as necessary and proper any restriction on the rightful exercise of any liberty.


...And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett Jan 1994

...And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Part I, the author contends that when economists persistently ignore the importance of contractual consent, they are missing the crucial problem of legitimacy. In Parts II and IV, he responds to the criticisms of his consent theory of contract advanced by Jay Feinman and Dennis Patterson. Both Feinman and Patterson object to the enterprise in which the author and others are engaging, and he explains why each is wrong to dismiss the current debate over default rules. Finally, in contrast, in Part III the author shows how Steven Burton's theory of default rules, which he finds most congenial, is …