Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Turning The Tables In Research And Development Licensing Contracts, Niyazi Taneri, Pascale Crama
Turning The Tables In Research And Development Licensing Contracts, Niyazi Taneri, Pascale Crama
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Research and development (R&D) collaborations between an innovator and her partner are often undertaken when neither party can bring the product to market individually, which precludes value creation without a joint effort. Yet, the uncertain nature of R&D complicates the monitoring of effort, and the resulting moral hazard reduces a collaboration’s value. Either party can avoid this outcome by acquiring the capability that is missing and then taking sole ownership of the project. That approach involves two types of risks: one related to whether the other party’s capability will be acquired and one related to how well it will be …
Licensing Contracts: Control Rights, Options And Timing, Pascale Crama, Bert De Reyck, Niyazi Taneri
Licensing Contracts: Control Rights, Options And Timing, Pascale Crama, Bert De Reyck, Niyazi Taneri
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Research and development (R&D) collaborations, common in high-tech industries, are challenging to manage due to technical and market risks as well as incentive problems. We investigate how control rights, options, payment terms and timing allow the innovator to capture maximum value from its R&D collaborations with a marketer. Our study reveals a counterintuitive result; the innovator may, under certain conditions, prefer to grant launch control rights or buy-out options to the marketer despite the fact that both terms restrict its downstream actions. We demonstrate that a menu of contracts is not necessary to address the adverse selection problem as the …
A Comparison Of Milestone-Based And Buyout Options Contracts For Coordinating R&D Partnerships, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Vibha Gaba, Sameer Hasija
A Comparison Of Milestone-Based And Buyout Options Contracts For Coordinating R&D Partnerships, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Vibha Gaba, Sameer Hasija
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We analyze optimal contractual arrangements in a bilateral research and development (R&D) partnership between a risk-averse provider that conducts early-stage research followed by a regulatory verification stage and a risk-neutral client that performs late-stage development activities, including production, distribution, and marketing. The problem is formulated as a sequential investment game with the client as the principal, where the investments are observable but not verifiable. The model captures the inherent incentive alignment problems of double-sided moral hazard, risk aversion, and holdup. We compare the efficacy of milestone-based options contracts and buyout options contracts from the client's perspective and identify conditions under …
Joint Product Improvement By Client And Customer Support Center: The Role Of Gain-Share Contracts In Coordination, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Alok Gupta, Sameer Hasija
Joint Product Improvement By Client And Customer Support Center: The Role Of Gain-Share Contracts In Coordination, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Alok Gupta, Sameer Hasija
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We study the role of different contract types in coordinating the joint product improvement effort of a client and a customer support center. The customer support center's costly efforts at joint product improvement include transcribing and analyzing customer feedback, analyzing market trends, and investing in product design. Yet this cooperative role must be adequately incentivized by the client, since it could lead to fewer service requests and hence lower revenues for the customer support center. We model this problem as a sequential game with double-sided moral hazard in a principal-agent framework (in which the client is the principal). We follow …