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Full-Text Articles in Law
Nineteenth-Century Orthodoxy, Richard B. Collins
Institutional Design And The Lingering Legacy Of Antifederalist Separation Of Powers Ideals In The States, Jim Rossi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article applies comparative institutional analysis to separation of powers under state constitutions, with a particular focus on the nondelegation doctrine and states' acceptance of Chadha-like restrictions on legislative oversight. The Article begins by contrasting state and federal doctrine and enforcement levels in each of these separation of powers contexts. Most state courts, unlike their federal counterparts, adhere to a strong nondelegation doctrine. In addition, many states accept (de facto if not de jure) even more explicit and sweeping legislative vetoes than the federal system. The Article highlights the contrast of federal and state approaches by identifying their similarity with …
Independent Cousel Law Improvements For The Next Five Years, John Q. Barrett
Independent Cousel Law Improvements For The Next Five Years, John Q. Barrett
Faculty Publications
This Article is adapted from remarks made in New Orleans on January 8, 1999, as part of an Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Administrative Law Section panel discussion entitled, "Separation of Powers Revisited: Should the Independent Counsel Law Be Renewed?" Our topic is "Should the Independent Counsel Law Be Renewed?" and my answer is, "Not exactly." I will not be, in other words, defending the status quo. Indeed, the empty chair you see here on the dais nicely contains the only "defender" of the status quo of whom I know. What I would like to do is remind us …
Constitutions And Spontaneous Orders: A Response To Professor Mcginnis, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki
Constitutions And Spontaneous Orders: A Response To Professor Mcginnis, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki
Articles
Professor John McGinnis has written a perceptive and provocative comment on our economic analysis of the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation.1 A brief summary of our areas of agreement and disagreement may help set the stage for this response. It appears that Professor McGinnis substantially agrees with the two central propositions of our article. First, he appears to agree with our definition of efficient traditions as those evolving over long periods of time from decentralized processes.2 Second, he explicitly agrees that Justices Scalia and Souter have adopted sub-optimal models of tradition because they rely on sources that lack the …
Finding The Constitution: An Economic Analysis Of Tradition's Role In Constitutional Interpretation, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki
Finding The Constitution: An Economic Analysis Of Tradition's Role In Constitutional Interpretation, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki
Articles
In this Article, Professor Pritchard and Professor Zywicki examine the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation, a topic that has received significant attention in recent years. After outlining the current debate over the use of tradition, the authors discuss the efficiency purposes of constitutionalism--precommitment and the reduction of agency costs--and demonstrate how the use of tradition in constitutional interpretation can serve these purposes. Rejecting both Justice Scalia's majoritarian model, which focuses on legislative sources of tradition, and Justice Souter's common-law model, which focuses on Supreme Court precedent as a source of tradition, the authors propose an alternative model--the "finding model"-- …
The Vertical Separation Of Powers, Victoria Nourse
The Vertical Separation Of Powers, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Standard understandings of the separation of powers begin with the concept of function. The author argues that function alone cannot predict important changes in structural incentives and thus serves as a poor proxy for assessing real risks to governmental structure. To illustrate this point, the article returns to proposals considered at the Constitutional Convention and considers difficult contemporary cases such as Morrison v. Olson, Clinton v. Jones, and the Supreme Court's more recent federalism decisions. In each instance, function appears to steer us wrong because it fails to understand separation of powers questions as ones of structural incentive …