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Full-Text Articles in Law
Collaborative Departmentalism, Matthew Steilen
Collaborative Departmentalism, Matthew Steilen
Journal Articles
This article examines the effect of departmentalism on presidential compliance with constitutional law. Most commentators agree that departmentalism weakens the influence of courts in the determination of constitutional meaning and the control of non-judicial actors. The article takes a different view. It defines “moderate departmentalism” as the authority of the President to refuse to adopt a constitutional interpretation announced by the Supreme Court. Drawing on ideas developed in the literature on “new governance” and administrative law, it then argues that moderate departmentalism increases the capacity of the federal courts to control presidential conduct.
Non-Pecuniary Interests And The Injudicious Limits Of Appellate Standing In Bankruptcy, S. Todd Brown
Non-Pecuniary Interests And The Injudicious Limits Of Appellate Standing In Bankruptcy, S. Todd Brown
Journal Articles
Standing to appeal bankruptcy court orders today is limited to those with a pecuniary interest. This prudential limitation is based on the person aggrieved requirement of Section 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 - a requirement that was not included in the Bankruptcy Code. This article examines the extensive differences between the Act and the Code, the potential justifications for extending the pecuniary interest test in spite of the omission of the person aggrieved requirement, and the potential ramifications for parties and the integrity of the bankruptcy process. This analysis suggests that standing to appeal bankruptcy orders should be …
Democracy Without A Net? Separation Of Powers And The Idea Of Self-Sustaining Constitutional Constraints On Undemocratic Behavior, James A. Gardner
Democracy Without A Net? Separation Of Powers And The Idea Of Self-Sustaining Constitutional Constraints On Undemocratic Behavior, James A. Gardner
Journal Articles
The United States Constitution is designed to achieve good government by relying on two distinct systems: a primary system that achieves good governance through democratic electoral accountability; and a set of self-sustaining structural backup systems designed for situations in which the democratic system fails, and which operate by limiting the ability of bad rulers to do serious harm to the public good. A key premise of this kind of dual structural arrangement is that effective backup systems must operate independently of primary democratic systems; because they are needed precisely when democratic mechanisms have failed, they cannot depend for their success …