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Full-Text Articles in Law

An Originalism For Foreign Affairs, Ingrid Wuerth Oct 2008

An Originalism For Foreign Affairs, Ingrid Wuerth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Legal scholarship on foreign affairs frequently focuses on the Constitution's text and original meaning, but generally does not fully engage debates about originalism as a method of modern constitutional interpretation. For its part, much of the scholarship defending originalism as a methodology has said little explicitly about foreign affairs. This short symposium contribution describes three contemporary normative arguments in favor of originalism - those advanced by Randy Barnett, Keith Whittington, and John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport - and then considers their application to foreign affairs. It concludes that these arguments are at best underdeveloped and at worst weak when it …


Of Inkblots And Originalism: Historical Ambiguity And The Case Of The Ninth Amendment, Kurt T. Lash Jan 2008

Of Inkblots And Originalism: Historical Ambiguity And The Case Of The Ninth Amendment, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

Ever since Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Ninth Amendment has been a flashpoint in debates over the merits of originalism as an interpretive theory. Judge Bork's comparison of interpreting the Ninth Amendment to reading a text obscured by an inkblot has been particularly subjected to intense criticism. The metaphor has been attacked as erasing the Ninth Amendment from the Constitution, and as representing the inevitably selective and inconsistent use of

text and history by so-called originalists.

It turns out, however, that not only was Judge Bork right to reject Justice Goldberg's reading of the Ninth Amendment, …


In The Trenches: Searches And The Misunderstood Common-Law History Of Suspicion And Probable Cause, Fabio Arcila Jan 2008

In The Trenches: Searches And The Misunderstood Common-Law History Of Suspicion And Probable Cause, Fabio Arcila

Scholarly Works

A detailed analysis of the common law during the Framers’ era, and of how it reflected the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions, shows that many judges believed they could issue search warrants without independently assessing the adequacy of probable cause, and that this view persisted even after the Fourth Amendment became effective. This conclusion challenges the leading originalist account of the Fourth Amendment, which Professor Thomas Davies published in the Michigan Law Review in 1999.

Learned treatises in particular, and to a lesser extent a few case decisions, had articulated a judicial duty to monitor probable cause. But it is a mistake …


A Response To Professor Steinberg’S Fourth Amendment Chutzpah, Fabio Arcila Jan 2008

A Response To Professor Steinberg’S Fourth Amendment Chutzpah, Fabio Arcila

Scholarly Works

Professor David Steinberg believes that the Fourth Amendment was intended only to provide some protection against physical searches of homes through imposition of a specific warrant requirement because the Framers' only object in promulgating the Fourth Amendment was to ban physical searches of homes under general warrants or no warrants at all. This response essay takes issue with his thesis by (1) discussing its implications, (2) reviewing some concerns with his methodology in reviewing the historical record, and (3) examining the theoretical implication underlying his thesis that, except as to homes, we have a majoritarian Fourth Amendment, and questioning whether …


The Intriguing Federalist Future Of Reproductive Rights, Scott A. Moss, Douglas M. Raines Jan 2008

The Intriguing Federalist Future Of Reproductive Rights, Scott A. Moss, Douglas M. Raines

Publications

As the decline of Roe v. Wade inspires renewed efforts to restrict federal constitutional abortion rights, the serious shortcomings of abortion rights advocates' strategies for preserving such rights will become increasingly apparent. Continued reliance on Roe is likely to fail with an increasingly unsympathetic Supreme Court. Even abortion rights supporters have begun to criticize the decision for weak reasoning, which is difficult to remedy at this late stage of federal abortion jurisprudence. Moreover, although autonomy and gender equality arguments for abortion rights would improve upon Roe's privacy rationale, such arguments would require abrogating substantial precedent and are, therefore, of limited …


When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus Jan 2008

When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Constitutional theory lacks an account of when each of the familiar sources of authority-text, original meaning, precedent, and so on-should be given weight. The dominant tendency is to regard all sources as potentially applicable in every case. In contrast, this Article proposes that each source of authority is pertinent in some categories of cases but not in others, much as a physical tool is appropriate for some but not all kinds of household tasks. The Article then applies this approach to identify the categories of cases in which original meaning is, or is not, a valid factor in constitutional decisionmaking.


The Choice Between Madison And Fdr, Randy E. Barnett Jan 2008

The Choice Between Madison And Fdr, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This exchange is about three clauses that have often been used by the courts since the New Deal to expand federal power: the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Taxation Clause, from which the spending power has (at least until today) been construed. This Essay addresses the originalist interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.


Incorporation And Originalist Theory, Lawrence B. Solum Jan 2008

Incorporation And Originalist Theory, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Does the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution incorporate the Bill of Rights contained in the first eight amendments? And how should an originalist answer that question? This paper focuses on the latter question--the issues of originalist theory that are raised by judicial and scholarly debates over what is called "incorporation."

The inquiry proceeds in six parts. Part I answers the questions: "What is incorporation?" and "What is originalism?" Part II examines the theoretical framework for an investigation of incorporation that operates within the narrow confines of interpretation of the linguistic meaning text based on the assumption that the …


Take-Ings, William Michael Treanor Jan 2008

Take-Ings, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The word property had many meanings in 1789, as it does today, and a critical aspect of the ongoing debate about the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause has centered on how the word should be read in the context of the Clause. Property has been read by Professor Thomas Merrill to refer to "ownership" interests, by Richard Epstein in terms of a broad Blackstonian conception of the individual control of the possession, use, and disposition of resources, by Benjamin Barros as reflective of constructions through individual expectations and state law, and by the author as physical control of …


Constitutional Clichés, Randy E. Barnett Jan 2008

Constitutional Clichés, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Popular discourse on constitutional interpretation and judicial review tend to employ a series of catch phrases that have become constitutional clichés. Phrases such as “judicial activism,” “judicial restraint,” “strict construction,” “not legislating from the bench,” “Framers’ intent,” the “dead hand of the past,” and “stare decisis” so dominate public commentary on the Constitution and the courts that quite often that is all one hears. Unfortunately, even law professors are not immune. There was a time when each of these catch phrases meant something and, although each could mean something again, in current debates all have become trite and largely devoid …