Law Commons^™

Dobbs Is Not A Religion Case, Bruce Ledewitz

Law Faculty Publications

I was unhappy, but not surprised, to see Canopy Forum including Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the case that overruled Roe v. Wade, in a call for submissions under the rubric, “Law and Religion in Pressing Supreme Court Cases.” I was not surprised because, for years, many critics have labeled pro-life opposition to Roe a purely religious viewpoint. But there is nothing inherently religious about qualms concerning abortion, nor is there anything specifically religious in the Dobbs majority opinion.

What Did The First Amendment Originally Mean?, Jud Campbell

Law Faculty Publications

The First Amendment says that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” For Americans, this language is familiar. But what exactly does it mean? How far do the speech and press clauses restrict governmental power? The founders, as we will see, answered these questions very differently than we typically do today. And the reasons why highlight fundamental shifts in American constitutional thought.

Natural Rights And The First Amendment, Jud Campbell

Law Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court often claims that the First Amendment reflects an original judgment about the proper scope of expressive freedom. After a century of academic debate, however, the meanings of speech and press freedoms at the Founding remain remarkably hazy. Many scholars, often pointing to Founding Era sedition prosecutions, emphasize the limited scope of these rights. Others focus on the libertarian ideas that helped shape opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798. Still more claim that speech and press freedoms lacked any commonly accepted meaning. The relationship between speech and press freedoms is contested, too. Most scholars view these freedoms …

Enduring Originalism, Kevin C. Walsh

Law Faculty Publications

If our law requires originalism in constitutional interpretation, then that would be a good reason to be an originalist. This insight animates what many have begun to call the "positive turn" in originalism. Defenses of originalism in this vein are "positive" in that they are based on the status of the Constitution, and constitutional law, as positive law. This approach shifts focus away from abstract conceptual or normative arguments about interpretation and focuses instead on how we actually understand and apply the Constitution as law. On these grounds, originalism rests on a factual claim about the content of our law: …

Republicanism And Natural Rights At The Founding, Jud Campbell

Law Faculty Publications

Today we tend to think about natural rights as non-positivist claims to limits on governmental authority — typically claims derived from religion, morality, or logic. These “rights,” by their very definition, exist independent of governmental control. Indeed, that is what makes them “natural.” This Essay, responding to Randy Barnett's Our Republican Constitution, sketches a different view of Founding-Era natural rights, their relationship to governmental authority, and their enforceability. With the exception of certain “rights of the mind,” natural rights were not really “rights” at all, in the sense of being determinate legal privileges or immunities. Rather, embracing natural rights meant …

Originalism All The Way Down?, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

In their new book, Originalism and the Good Constitution, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport attempt to vanquish what they call constructionist originalism with an approach that I call methodist originalism. Unlike constructionist theories, which allow for non-originalist construction of underdetermined texts, methodist originalism proposes filling in the historical gaps with what McGinnis and Rappaport claim were the originally accepted methods of interpretation. This is originalism all the way down.

It’s a creative effort, and one that appropriately rejects some of the more latitudinous originalist theories currently in play. Unfortunately, the same history McGinnis and Rappaport rely upon fatally undermines …

Originalism As Jujitsu, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

The Ninth Amendment presents an irresistible mystery. It speaks of "other rights" retained by the people and it prohibits interpretations which "deny or disparage" those rights. The Amendment, however, tells us nothing about what these rights are or how they can be enforced. On the one hand, this makes the Ninth rather difficult to apply. On the other hand, the lack of definitional clarity also makes the Ninth Amendment something of a desideratum for those seeking expanded judicial protection of previously unrecognized individual rights. Accordingly, the Ninth Amendment has been cited in support of everything from Dial-a-Porn to freedom from …

Of Inkblots And Originalism: Historical Ambiguity And The Case Of The Ninth Amendment, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

Ever since Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Ninth Amendment has been a flashpoint in debates over the merits of originalism as an interpretive theory. Judge Bork's comparison of interpreting the Ninth Amendment to reading a text obscured by an inkblot has been particularly subjected to intense criticism. The metaphor has been attacked as erasing the Ninth Amendment from the Constitution, and as representing the inevitably selective and inconsistent use of

text and history by so-called originalists.

It turns out, however, that not only was Judge Bork right to reject Justice Goldberg's reading of the Ninth Amendment, …

Originalism, Popular Sovereignty And Reverse Stare Decisis, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

Although all interpretive methods must grapple with the issue of stare decisis, the issue is particularly acute for originalists due to the potentially radical discontinuity between original meaning and modern doctrine. An unmediated enforcement of original understanding of the Constitution would likely reverse countless precedents and impose unacceptably high costs in terms of the rule of law. On the other hand, upholding a precedent despite its variance with the original understanding undermines the very legitimacy of legal review according to most theories of originalism. Focusing on the most common normative basis for originalism, popular sovereignty, the article identifies those cases …

Bork Was The Beginning: Constitutional Moralism And The Politics Of Judicial Selection, Gary L. Mcdowell

Law Faculty Publications

On October 23, 1987, the United States Senate committed what many considered then-and what many still consider today-to be an unforgivable political and constitutional sin. Wielding its power to advise and consent on nominations to the Supreme Court of the United States, the upper house voted 58-42 not to confirm Judge Robert H. Bork. The vote, which was the largest margin of defeat in history for a nominee to the Supreme Court, concluded one of the most tumultuous political battles in the history of the republic, a battle that would transform the process of judicial selection for years to come.