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Bush, Obama And Beyond: Observations On The Prospect For Fact Checking Executive Department Threat Claims Before The Use Of Force, Leslie Gielow Jacobs Jan 2010

Bush, Obama And Beyond: Observations On The Prospect For Fact Checking Executive Department Threat Claims Before The Use Of Force, Leslie Gielow Jacobs

McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

This piece looks at the recurring problem of inflated threat claims offered by executive branch actors to persuade the Nation to consent to the use of force. It sets out the experience of the Bush Administration’s use of incorrect threat claims to persuade the country to consent to the use of force in Iraq as a backdrop to evaluating the President Obama’s use of threat claims to support the continuing use of force in Afghanistan. Although comparison of threat advocacy by the Bush and Obama administrations must be imperfect, it allows for some observations about the extent to which the …


A Critical Consideration Of Executive Orders: Glimmerings Of Autopoiesis In The Executive Role, John C. Duncan Jr Jan 2010

A Critical Consideration Of Executive Orders: Glimmerings Of Autopoiesis In The Executive Role, John C. Duncan Jr

Journal Publications

The United States Constitution is a parsimonious document, meant to retain the dynamic processes of the three branches of government within their respective spheres and overarching principles, beyond which it offers the latitude necessary for the developing nation to adapt to future contingencies. The Congress and the President are the governing institutions of two of those branches, to which agility is essential as a matter of survival. The most agile tool that the President has is the executive order. There is no statutory authority for the federal executive order or any other source that describes its legal effect, as such, …


Obama's Equivocal Defense Of Agency Independence, Kevin M. Stack Jan 2010

Obama's Equivocal Defense Of Agency Independence, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

You can't judge a President by his view of Article II. At the very least, only looking to a President's construction of Article II gives a misleading portrait of the actual legal authority recent Presidents have asserted.

President Obama is no exception, as revealed by his defense of the constitutionality of an independent agency from challenge under Article II in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board' (PCAOB) in the Supreme Court this term. The PCAOB is an independent agency, located inside the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), created to regulate accounting of public companies in the wake of …


Presidential Power In Historical Perspective: Reflections' On Calabresi And Yoo's The Unitary Executive, Christopher S. Yoo Jan 2010

Presidential Power In Historical Perspective: Reflections' On Calabresi And Yoo's The Unitary Executive, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

On February 6 and 7, 2009, more than three dozen of the nation’s most distinguished commentators on presidential power gathered in Philadelphia to explore themes raised by a book authored by Steven Calabresi and I co-authored reviewing the history of presidential practices with respect to the unitary executive. The conference honoring our book and the special journal issue bringing together the articles presented there provide a welcome opportunity both to look backwards on the history of our project and to look forwards at the questions yet to be answered.


Clear Statement Rules And Executive War Powers, Curtis A. Bradley Jan 2010

Clear Statement Rules And Executive War Powers, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

This article is based on a presentation at the Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium on Law and Public Policy that explored the theme of separation of powers in American constitutionalism.

The scope of the President’s independent war powers is notoriously unclear, and courts are understandably reluctant to issue constitutional rulings that might deprive the federal government as a whole of the flexibility needed to respond to crises. As a result, courts often look for signs that Congress has either supported or opposed the President’s actions and rest their decisions on statutory grounds. There have been both liberal and conservative …