Law Commons^™

Teens, Porn, And Video Games: Is It Time To Rethink Ginsberg?, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This term the Supreme Court will decide whether states can constitutionally ban sales of violent videogames to minors. In reaching its decision, the Court will inevitably be faced with how to deal with Ginsberg v. New York, the case that allowed states to forbid sales of non-obscene (constitutionally "protected") pornography to persons under age 17.

The opinion in Ginsberg, if not the result, is an odd duck in First Amendment jurisprudence. It is a case that applied "rational basis" review in an area where the Supreme Court now insists on strict scrutiny. But the Court predicated its use of rational …

Habeas Corpus In Times Of Emergency: A Historical And Comparative View, Brian Farrell

Pace International Law Review Online Companion

No abstract provided.

“Sexting” And The First Amendment, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

“Sexting” and other teen autopornography are becoming a widespread phenomenon, with perhaps 20% of teenagers admitting to producing nude or semi-nude pictures of themselves and an ever greater proportion, perhaps as many as 50%, having received such pictures from friends and classmates. It is, moreover, beginning to result in criminal prosecutions. Given the reality of changing social practices, mores and technology utilization, today’s pornography laws are a trap for unwary teens and operate, in effect, to criminalize a large fraction of America’s young people. As such, these laws and prosecutions represent a stark example of the contradictions that can occur …

Privacy Revisited: Gps Tracking As Search And Seizure, Bennett L. Gershman

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Part I of this Article discusses the facts in People v. Weaver, the majority and dissenting opinions in the Appellate Division, Third Department, and the majority and dissenting opinions in the Court of Appeals. Part II addresses the question that has yet to be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court – whether GPS tracking of a vehicle by law enforcement constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Part III addresses the separate question that the Court of Appeals did not address - whether the surreptitious attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. …

Bad Faith Exception To Prosecutorial Immunity For Brady Violations, Bennett L. Gershman

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Part I of this Article discusses Imbler’s adoption of absolute immunity for prosecutors. Part II discusses Imbler’s extension of absolute immunity to a prosecutor’s violation of his disclosure duty under Brady v. Maryland. Part III describes the ease with which prosecutors are able to evade the Brady rule and the difficulty of enforcing compliance with Brady. Part IV discusses the absence of any meaningful sanctions to deter and punish prosecutors for willful violations of Brady. Part V proposes a bad faith exception to absolute immunity of prosecutors for Brady violations.

“Hard Strikes And Foul Blows”: Berger V. United States 75 Years After, Bennett L. Gershman

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

My essay examines one of the most iconic decision of the Supreme Court seventy five years later. Berger v. United States is the most eloquent and authoritative description of the prosecutor's duty "not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done." My essay looks at why the Court decided to take up the case then, and why it has become so prominent in criminal law and ethics.

Untangling Double Jeopardy In Mixed-Verdict Cases, Lissa Griffin

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Article attempts to describe and untangle the confusion leading up to and resulting from the Yeager decision. Part II examines the four distinct double jeopardy areas presented in Yeager, with particular emphasis on the two conflicting precedents of collateral estoppel and the non-finality of a hung jury. Part III closely examines the Yeager decision itself. Part IV analyzes Yeager in light of its tangled doctrinal history and places it in the context of the Court's several other short-lived and rapidly reversed precedents. The Article concludes that the Court's holding in Yeager is neither justified by its precedent nor adequately …

Legalism And Decisionism In Crisis, Noa Ben-Asher

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

In the years since September 11, 2001, scholars have advocated two main positions on the role of law and the proper balance of powers among the branches of government in emergencies. This Article critiques these two approaches-which could be called Legalism and Decisionism-and offers a third way. Debates between Legalism and Decisionism turn on (1) whether emergencies can be governed by prescribed legal norms; and (2) what the balance of powers among the three branches of government should be in emergencies. Under the Legalist approach, legal norms can and should guide governmental response to emergencies, and the executive branch is …

The Government-Speech Doctrine: “Recently Minted,” But Counterfeit, Steven H. Goldberg

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

The foci of this Article are the ill-advised creation of a government-speech doctrine in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009), and its potential for substantial First Amendment mischief particularly with respect to the establishment of religion. Created out of whole cloth, with no regard for precedent, and in a case that did not even raise the issue of government speech, the doctrine permits the government to speak with viewpoint about controversial cultural issues upon which the government has no constitutional right to act. Asked to find unconstitutional the refusal of a municipality to allow a Summum …

Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus Punishment, Emily Gold Waldman

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This article examines the Supreme Court’s student speech framework and argues that, in focusing exclusively on the types of student speech that can be restricted, the framework fails to build in any differentiation as to how such speech can be restricted. This is true even though there are two very distinct types of speech restrictions in schools: suppression of the speech itself; and after-the-fact punishment of the student speaker. As the student speech landscape itself gets more complex – given schools’ experimentation with new disciplinary regimes along with the tremendous rise in student cyber-speech – the blurring of that distinction …