Law Commons^™

Examination Of The Constitutional Amendment On Marriage: Hearing Before The Subcomm. On The Constitution, Civil Rights, And Property Rights Of The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 109th Cong., Oct. 20, 2005 (Statement Of Professor Louis Michael Seidman, Geo. U. L. Center), Louis Michael Seidman

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

The Coherentism Of Democracy And Distrust, Michael C. Dorf

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking The Constitution Seriously Outside The Courts, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Larry Sager and Larry Kramer have written important books that, in quite different ways, call for taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts. Sager's Justice in Plainclothes' and Kramer's The People Themselves2 nonetheless join issue in significant ways, and therefore it is illuminating to analyze them as a pair.

To get a handle on the differences between the two Larrys' books, I have concocted the following fanciful hypothetical. Imagine a law school with a faculty that includes Ronald Dworkin: court-centered constitutional theorist extraordinaire and proponent of a liberal moral reading of the American Constitution.3 Further imagine that the faculty includes …

The Statutory President, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

American public law has no answer to the question of how a court should evaluate the president's assertion of statutory authority. In this Article, I develop an answer by making two arguments. First, the same framework of judicial review should apply to claims of statutory authority made by the president and federal administrative agencies. This argument rejects the position that the president's constitutional powers should shape the question of statutory interpretation presented when the president claims that a statute authorizes his actions. Once statutory review is separated from consideration of the president's constitutional powers, the courts should insist, as they …

Political Bargaining And Judicial Intervention In Constitutional And Antitrust Federalism, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Federal judicial deference to state and local regulation is at the center of contentious debates regarding the implementation of competition policy. This Article invokes a political process bargaining framework to develop a principled approach for addressing the appropriate level of judicial intervention under the dormant commerce clause and state action immunity from antitrust enforcement. Using illustrations from network industries, it is argued that, at core, these two independent doctrines share a common concern with political (not only market) failure by focusing on the incentives faced by powerful stakeholders in state and local lawmaking. More important, they share the common purpose …

Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, And Progressive Change, Linda C. Mcclain, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

This paper evaluates arguments made in Ran Hirschl's powerful and sobering book, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard, 2004). Studying Canada, Israel, South Africa, and New Zealand, Hirschl aims to dispel what he views as the hollow hopes that constitutionalism and judicial review will bring about progressive change around the world. If Gerald Rosenberg, in his book, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change, focused on the hollow hopes of liberals for social change securing, e.g., racial equality (Brown) and women's reproductive freedom (Roe), Hirschl focuses on hollow hopes for progressive economic change …

Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, And The Federalist Revival After Gonzales V. Raich, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Jacksonian Makings Of The Taney Court, Mark A. Graber

Faculty Scholarship

Many twentieth century commentators regard the willingness of Taney Court majorities to declare laws unconstitutional as proof that the justices on that tribunal adjured Jacksonian partisanship upon taking the bench. Old Republicans during the 1820s fulminated against judicial review of state legislation and sought to repeal Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1787, but they were apparently frustrated by a Taney Court which continued imposing contract clause and dormant commerce clause limits on state power. This paper demonstrates that Jacksonians in office supported judicial power. Jacksonian animus was more directed at McCulloch v. Maryland than either Marbury v. Madison …

"Meet The New Boss": The New Judicial Center, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A document entitled ‘Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation’ published in 1988 by the Reagan era Department of Justice is the springboard for Professor Tushnet's discussion of the Supreme Court's "new center. " The Guidelines urged Department of Justice litigators to foster a nearly exclusive reliance on original understanding in constitutional interpretation and to resort to legislative history only as a last resort. The Guidelines also advised Department of Justice litigators to seek substantive legal changes including more restrictive standing requirements, an end to the creation of unenumerated individual rights, greater constitutional protection of property rights, and greater limits on congressional power. …

Why You Should Read My Book Anyhow: A Reply To Trevor Morrison, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Authors rarely have the opportunity to respond to their reviewers in the same issue in which the review is published, so I am grateful to the Cornell Law Review for inviting me to do so and to Trevor Morrison for graciously agreeing. I am also appreciative of the respectful tone that Professor Morrison employs in his comments on a book with which he so obviously disagrees. Coming from a critic, the positive qualities he attributes to Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty are especially significant. Yet he does disagree with me, which means that I disagree with him, …

Judicial Review Before Marbury, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

While scholars have long probed the original understanding of judicial review and the early judicial review case law, this article presents a study of the judicial review case law in the United States before Marbury v. Madison that is dramatically more complete than prior work and that challenges previous scholarship on the original understanding of judicial review on the two most critical dimensions: how well judicial review was established at the time of the Founding and when it was exercised. Where prior work argues that judicial review was rarely exercised before Marbury (or that it was created in Marbury), …

Trumping Precedent With Original Meaning: Not As Radical As It Sounds, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Originalism was thought to be buried in the 1980s with critiques such as those by Paul Brest and Jeff Powell. Brest charged that originalism was unworkable, while Powell maintained that originalism was inconsistent with the original intentions of the Founders. Others raised the moral challenge of why we should be ruled by the "dead hand" of the past. Yet an originalist approach to interpretation has-like a phoenix from the ashes or Dracula from his grave, depending on your point of view-survived into the Twenty-first Century as an intellectual contender. Indeed, it has thrived like no other approach to interpretation.

Constitutionalization, Girardeau A. Spann

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Students of constitutional law tend to suspect pretty early on that the Constitution simply means whatever the Supreme Court says that it means. Rather than fight that intuition, I think it is best to treat the student insight as one of the basic starting assumptions when teaching a course in Constitutional Law. The goal then becomes to help students figure out how best to maneuver and feel comfortable in a legal universe where the Constitution has only contingent meaning.

What the Supreme Court does when it clothes its political policy preferences in the garb of constitutional law can be described …

The Unfulfilled Promise Of The Constitution In Executive Hands, Cornelia T. Pillard

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Many leading constitutional scholars now argue for greater reliance on the political branches to supplement or even supplant judicial enforcement of the Constitution. Responding to our national preoccupation with the judiciary as the mechanism of constitutional enforcement, these scholars stress that the executive and legislature, too, bear responsibility to think about the Constitution for themselves and to take steps to fulfill the Constitution's promise. Joining a debate that goes back at least as far as Marbury v. Madison, current scholars seek to reawaken the political branches to their constitutional potential, and urge the Supreme Court to leave the other branches …