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Full-Text Articles in Law
Forgetting Oblivion: The Demise Of The Legislative Pardon, Bernadette A. Meyler
Forgetting Oblivion: The Demise Of The Legislative Pardon, Bernadette A. Meyler
Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers
Since the post-Civil War cases arising out of conflicts over the proper location of the amnesty power, it has generally been thought that pardon and amnesty are synonymous and that the capacity to effect both is vested in the President under Article II. The history of the English version of amnesty—oblivion—within the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the colonial and state oblivions that were legislatively enacted from 1650 through the period of the Second Continental Congress suggest otherwise. Oblivion was distinct from pardoning because it erased the underlying events rather than remitting punishment and often arose as a response to …
Putting The Democracy In Democracy And Distrust: The Coherentist Case For Representation Reinforcement, Michael C. Dorf
Putting The Democracy In Democracy And Distrust: The Coherentist Case For Representation Reinforcement, Michael C. Dorf
Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers
No abstract provided.
Property As A Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example, Gregory S. Alexander
Property As A Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example, Gregory S. Alexander
Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers
This article examines an apparent paradox in comparative constitutional law. Property rights are not treated as a fundamental right in American constitutional law; they are, however, under the Basic Law (i.e., constitution) of Germany, a social-welfare state that otherwise gives less weight to property. The article uses this apparent paradox as a vehicle for considering the different reasons why constitutions protect property. It explains the difference between the German and American constitutional treatment of property on the basis of the quite different approaches taken in the two systems to the purposes of constitutional protection of property.
An Institutional Approach To Legal Indeterminacy, Michael C. Dorf
An Institutional Approach To Legal Indeterminacy, Michael C. Dorf
Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers
For over a generation, academic jurisprudence and constitutional theory have attempted to reconcile, on the one hand, the rule of law and the Constitution's fundamentality with, on the other hand, the fact that legal and constitutional rules frequently do not produce determinate answers to concrete controversies. The approach of radical democrats who would abandon judicial review is unacceptable to all those who believe that some judicially enforceable limits on politics are needed to prevent majoritarian tyranny. At the same time, however, constitutional theories that attempt to justify judicial review have limited utility; at best they strike a compromise between the …