Law Commons^™

The New Professional Plaintiffs In Shareholder Litigation, Jessica M. Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the old professional plaintiffs in shareholder litigation, detailing Congress's efforts in the 1990s to eliminate these plaintiffs. Part II describes the new professional plaintiffs in shareholder litigation, combining empirical data with a discussion of illustrative cases. Part III builds on this discussion by proposing a·new conceptual framework to address the problem of professional plaintiffs in corporate litigation.

Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A 'Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Articles

While reference to "fiduciary duties" (plural) is routinely employed in the United States as a convenient short-hand for a corporate director's duties of care and loyalty, other common-law countries generally treat loyalty as the sole "fiduciary duty." This contrast prompts some important questions about the doctrinal structure for duty of care analysis adopted in Delaware, the principal jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Specifically, has the evolution of Delaware's convoluted and problematic framework for evaluating disinterested board conduct been facilitated by styling care a "fiduciary" duty? If so, then how should Delaware lawmakers and judges respond moving forward?

In …

Proposals For Corporate Governance Reform: Six Decades Of Ineptitude And Counting, Douglas M. Branson

Articles

This article is a retrospective of corporate governance reforms various academics have authored over the last 60 years or so, by the author of the first U.S. legal treatise on the subject of corporate governance (Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance (1993)). The first finding is as to periodicity: even casual inspection reveals that the reformer group which controls the "reform" agenda has authored a new and different reform proposal every five years, with clock-like regularity. The second finding flows from the first, namely, that not one of these proposals has made so much as a dent in the problems that …

Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A "Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

While reference to "fiduciary duties" (plural) is routinely employed in the United States as a convenient short-hand for a corporate director's duties of care and loyalty, other common-law countries generally treat loyalty as the sole "fiduciary duty." This contrast prompts some important questions about the doctrinal structure for duty of care analysis adopted in Delaware, the principal jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Specifically, has the evolution of Delaware's convoluted and problematic framework for evaluating disinterested board conduct been facilitated by styling care a "fiduciary" duty? If so, then how should Delaware lawmakers and judges respond moving forward?

In …

The Next Stage Of Csr For Canada: Transformational Corporate Governance, Hybrid Legal Structures, And The Growth Of Social Enterprise, Carol Liao

All Faculty Publications

The period when corporate social responsibility (CSR) only referred to corporate philanthropic donations has passed. Present day CSR is intimately intertwined with sustainable development, and its growth in the last several decades has been evident in Canada. The recent appearance of “hybrid” corporate legal structures on the international stage marks a growing trend toward enabling the dual pursuit of economic and social mandates for businesses. It suggests that the next significant stage in the CSR movement will be in the reformation and creation of corporate legal models that not only enable, but require, CSR concepts to be embodied within corporate …

Fiduciary Duties And Fiduciary Outs, Julian Velasco

Journal Articles

Fiduciary outs are virtually ubiquitous in acquisition agreements, but almost unheard of in other contexts. This is because the fiduciary out is an inherently problematic device. Although it is not intended to do so, it almost necessarily transforms an agreement into an option in the hands of one party. Nevertheless, fiduciary outs make sense in the context of acquisition agreements. This is because fiduciary outs are essentially contractual proxies for fiduciary duties. As such, they have the same purpose: to protect shareholders from abuse at the hands of directors. Fiduciary outs do this in the context of acquisition agreements by …

The Role Of Unfair Competition In The Common Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Gideon Parchomovsky

Faculty Scholarship

Does the idea of “unfair competition” present the law with a viable alternative to thinking about the regulation of information and informational resources, independent of the traditional categories of the common law (e.g., property/tort) and the assumptions that these categories entail? In this chapter, we argue that, although the answer to that question is no, unfair competition nevertheless plays an important role in complementing the categories of property and torts as they apply to competitive settings. Specifically, unfair competition allows courts to both broaden and narrow the traditional notions of property and torts – especially as they apply to the …