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Full-Text Articles in Law
Controlling Executive Compensation Through The Tax Code, Gregg D. Polsky
Controlling Executive Compensation Through The Tax Code, Gregg D. Polsky
Scholarly Works
This article analyzes Internal Revenue Code § 162(m), which in general denies public companies a deduction for annual non-performance-based compensation in excess of $1,000,000 paid to senior executive officers. Congress enacted § 162(m) with the intent to reduce the overall level of executive compensation and to influence the composition of executive compensation in favor of components that are more sensitive to firm performance. Notably, § 162(m) represents the most direct Congressional effort to influence executive compensation design. In light of recent events, Congress is being called upon to once again address the perceived problem of overgenerous executive pay packages. Accordingly, …
Where's The Beef: A Few Words About Paying For Performance In Bankruptcy, Jonathan C. Lipson
Where's The Beef: A Few Words About Paying For Performance In Bankruptcy, Jonathan C. Lipson
All Faculty Scholarship
This brief essay responds to Yair Listokin’s article, “Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy: Why CEOs Should Be Compensated with Debt,” 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (2007). Professor Listokin argues that we should give official creditors’ committees the power to pay management of reorganizing debtors with corporate debt. This, he argues, would properly align their incentives with those who are most likely affected, the “residual claimant” unsecured creditors. Although Professor Listokin’s proposal is a welcome addition to our literature on corporate reorganization, this essay points out several basic problems with it: • First, nothing currently prevents parties from doing this …
The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, And Executive Compensation, D. A. Jeremy Telman
The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, And Executive Compensation, D. A. Jeremy Telman
Law Faculty Publications
Despite its ubiquity in corporate law, the business judgment rule remains a doctrinal puzzle. Both courts and scholars offer different understandings of the Rule's role in litigation brought against corporate directors and different justifications for its deployment to insulate such directors from liability for breaches of fiduciary duties. This Article rejects all existing justifications for the Rule and argues that the Rule is no longer needed to protect directors from liability either because the justifications offered never made any sense or because directors are now protected by other, statutory means. Rather, the Rule is needed today not to protect directors, …
Does "Say On Pay" Work? Lessons On Making Ceo Compensation Accountable, Stephen Davis
Does "Say On Pay" Work? Lessons On Making Ceo Compensation Accountable, Stephen Davis
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
Based on a review of UK experience, advisory shareowner votes on executive compensation policies (“say on pay”) appear practical for adaptation in North America and other markets. They represent a lever that could strengthen both boards and shareholders in the quest to better align top corporate pay with performance. But they are hardly a panacea on their own. They are likely to spur dialogue between boards and shareholders. However, market parties in the UK—which pioneered the advisory vote concept — remain concerned that boards and investors are each falling short of success in tethering pay to performance. US players may …
Reforming The Taxation Of Deferred Compensation, Gregg D. Polsky, Ethan Yale
Reforming The Taxation Of Deferred Compensation, Gregg D. Polsky, Ethan Yale
Scholarly Works
Executive pay is currently a topic of significant interest for policymakers, academics, and the popular press. Just weeks ago, in reaction to widespread press reports and academic criticism of extravagant executive perquisites, the SEC proposed new regulations designed to change fundamentally the manner in which executive compensation is reported to share-holders. Despite all of this attention, one significant aspect of executive deferred compensation has gone virtually unnoticed - the federal tax rules governing this form of compensation are fundamentally flawed and must be extensively over-hauled. These rules are flawed because they often create a significant incentive for companies and their …