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Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this traditional view, …

Introducing The Law Of Nonprofit Organizations And Philanthropy, David A. Brennen

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

On January 5,2007, the Nonprofit and Philanthropy Law Section of AALS held its first program at the AALS Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. The program, entitled "State-Level Legal Reform of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations," was a fitting way to launch what should prove to be a valuable contribution to the study of law relating to nonprofit organizations and philanthropy. This burgeoning area of academic legal study is well poised to grow by leaps and bounds in the coming years due to its impact on many traditional areas of legal study, including tax law, corporate law, estate law, trust law, …