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Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, Randall Thomas, John E. Core, Wayne Guay
Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, Randall Thomas, John E. Core, Wayne Guay
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this paper, we review Pay Without Performance by Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. The book develops and summarizes the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices in the U.S., and offers a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S. executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are failing, and systemic reform is needed. This review summarizes the book in some detail and offers some counter-arguments. The book's thesis is that executive compensation practices are bad for shareholders (not "optimal") because they are the product of "managerial power." Managerial power arises because boards of directors at public companies …
Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, Randall Thomas
Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, Randall Thomas
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This paper examines internal pay disparities in American public corporations and argues that wide gaps between the top and bottom of the pay scale can, in certain circumstances, directly and adversely affect firm value, that corporate boards should be informed about these effects, and that they should, in some cases, reduce internal pay differentials to address them. In support of this thesis, it analyzes numerous empirical studies that have shown that wide disparities in corporate pay scales can adversely affect firm value. These studies demonstrate that, at many types of organizations, as internal pay differentials grow, employees and lower level …