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Dodd-Frank's Say On Pay: Will It Lead To A Greater Role For Shareholders In Corporate Governance?, Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter, James F. Cotter
Dodd-Frank's Say On Pay: Will It Lead To A Greater Role For Shareholders In Corporate Governance?, Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter, James F. Cotter
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
"Say on pay" gives shareholders an advisory vote on a company's pay practices for its top executives. Beginning in 2011, Dodd-Frank mandated such votes at public companies. The first year of "say on pay" under the new legislation may have changed the dialogue and give-and-take in the shareholder-management relationship at some companies, particularly on the question of executive pay.
We study the evolution of shareholder voting on "say on pay" - beginning in 2006 as a fledgling shareholder movement to get "say on pay" on the corporate ballot, evolving as a handful of companies and later the financial firms receiving …
The Globalization (Americanization?) Of Executive Pay, Randall Thomas, Brian R. Cheffins
The Globalization (Americanization?) Of Executive Pay, Randall Thomas, Brian R. Cheffins
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In the United States, the remuneration packages of top executives are characterized by a strong emphasis on pay-for-performance and by a highly lucrative "upside." There is much discussion of the possibility that executive pay practices will globalize in accordance with this pattern. This Article assesses whether such convergence is likely to occur. After surveying briefly the key components of managerial remuneration and after examining the essential elements of the "U.S. pay paradigm," the Article considers market-oriented dynamics that could constitute a "global compensation imperative." These include wider dispersion of share ownership, more cross-border hiring of executives, growing international merger and …
Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, Randall Thomas
Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, Randall Thomas
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This paper examines internal pay disparities in American public corporations and argues that wide gaps between the top and bottom of the pay scale can, in certain circumstances, directly and adversely affect firm value, that corporate boards should be informed about these effects, and that they should, in some cases, reduce internal pay differentials to address them. In support of this thesis, it analyzes numerous empirical studies that have shown that wide disparities in corporate pay scales can adversely affect firm value. These studies demonstrate that, at many types of organizations, as internal pay differentials grow, employees and lower level …
Should Shareholders Have A Greater Say Over Executive Pay??, Randall S. Thomas, Brian R. Cheffins
Should Shareholders Have A Greater Say Over Executive Pay??, Randall S. Thomas, Brian R. Cheffins
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Executive pay arrangements in Britain's publicly quoted companies have been subjected to much criticism in recent years. Proposals that shareholders should have a greater direct say over managerial remuneration have been a by-product of the concerns expressed. Debate on this point, however, has been largely speculative. This is because there is little evidence available in the United Kingdom indicating how shareholders would exercise any new powers they might be given. This paper addresses the evidentiary gap by drawing upon the experience in the United States, where empirical work indicates that shareholder voting only operates as a potential check when pay …