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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Legal Diversification, Kelli A. Alces
Legal Diversification, Kelli A. Alces
Scholarly Publications
The greatest protection investors have from the risks associated with capital investment is diversification. This Essay introduces a new dimension of diversification for investors: legal diversification. Legal diversification of investment means building a portfolio of securities that are governed by a variety of legal rules. Legal diversification protects investors from the risk that a particular method of minimizing agency costs will prove ineffective and allows investors to own securities in a variety of firms, with each security governed by the most efficient set of legal rules given the circumstances of the investment. Diversification of investment by legal rules is possible …
Financial System Engineering, Manuel A. Utset
Financial System Engineering, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Towards A Moral Agency Theory Of The Shareholder Bylaw Power, Jay B. Kesten
Towards A Moral Agency Theory Of The Shareholder Bylaw Power, Jay B. Kesten
Scholarly Publications
Corporate bylaws are the new leading edge of a decades-long struggle between shareholders and managers over the allocation of decision-making authority in public companies. Bylaws are the only method by which shareholders can unilaterally restrict the powers and discretion of the board. Yet the scope of this statutory authority remains notoriously uncertain. Corporate law scholars generally agree that there is a limited domain in which shareholders can restrict managerial authority, but disagree on the appropriate boundary. The Delaware Supreme Court recently confronted this issue for the first time in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, but that decision …
Fraudulent Corporate Signals: Conduct As Securities Fraud, Manuel A. Utset
Fraudulent Corporate Signals: Conduct As Securities Fraud, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
Paying a dividend, repurchasing shares, underpricing an initial public offering, pledging collateral, and borrowing using short-term, instead of long-term debt, are all forms of corporate communications. They are “corporate signals” that tell investors certain things about a company’s operations and current financial position, and about the managers’ confidence in its future performance. This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the relationship between corporate signals and securities fraud. The incentive to communicate using corporate signals has increased in recent years, a phenomenon that, I argue, is due to the grow-ing complexity of public corporations, and, importantly, to a number of …