Law Commons^™

Due Process Discontents In Mass-Tort Bankruptcy, J. Maria Glover

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

No abstract provided.

A Process For Politics, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

I argue that consistent and public process observance has a distinctly valuable function in sovereign debt restructuring, with no precise equivalent in national insolvency regimes. National regimes reflect the distribution bargains of their enactment, presumptively legitimate and binding. Debtors and creditors allocate insolvency losses in their shadow, with liquidation as a backstop and politics just outside the frame. All else equal, the restructuring process has a harder job with sovereign debt. There is no liquidation backstop and no default distribution scenario. Each crisis resolution episode must allocate losses from scratch among the country’s citizens, foreign and domestic creditors, and other …

Cacs And Doorknobs, Anna Gelpern, Jeromin Zettelmeyer

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In response to debt crises, policy makers often feature Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds among the pillars of international financial architecture. However, the content of official pronouncements about CACs suggests that CACs are more like doorknobs: a process tool with limited impact on the incidence or ultimate outcome of a debt restructuring. We ask whether CACs are welfare improving and, if so, whether they are pillars or doorknobs. The history of CACs in corporate debt suggests that CACs can be good, bad or unimportant depending on their vulnerability to abuse and the available alternatives, including bankruptcy and debt …

Sovereign Debt: Now What?, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The sovereign debt restructuring regime looks like it is coming apart. Changing patterns of capital flows, old creditors’ weakening commitment to past practices, and other stakeholders’ inability to take over, or coalesce behind a viable alternative, have challenged the regime from the moment it took shape in the mid-1990s. By 2016, its survival cannot be taken for granted. Crises in Argentina, Greece, and Ukraine since 2010 exposed the regime’s perennial failures and new shortcomings. Until an alternative emerges, there may be messier, more protracted restructurings, more demands on public resources, and more pressure on national courts to intervene in disputes …

Contract Hope And Sovereign Redemption, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Sovereign immunity has served as a partial substitute for bankruptcy protection, but it has encouraged a minority of creditors to pursue unorthodox legal remedies with spillover effects far beyond the debtor-creditor relationship. The attempt to enforce Argentina’s pari passu clause in New York is an example of such a remedy, which relies primarily on collateral damage to other creditors and market infrastructure to obtain settlement from a debtor that would not pay. The District Court decision, now on appeal before the Second Circuit, may not make holding out more attractive in future restructurings – but it would make participation less …

Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem Of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Feature considers the debts of quasi-sovereign states in light of proposals to let them file for bankruptcy protection. States that have ceded some but not all sovereign prerogatives to a central government face distinct challenges as debtors. It is unhelpful to analyze these challenges mainly through the bankruptcy lens. State bankruptcy posits an institutional fix for a problem that remains theoretically undefined and empirically contested. I suggest a way of mapping the problem that does not work back from a solution. I highlight the implications of sovereign immunity, immortality, concurrent authority, macroeconomic policy, and democratic accountability for quasi-sovereign debt …

Home Foreclosures: Will Voluntary Mortgage Modification Help Families Save Their Homes? Part Ii? : Hearing Before The H. Comm. On The Judiciary Subcomm. On Commercial And Administrative Law, 111th Cong., Dec. 11, 2009 (Statement Of Associate Professor Adam J. Levitin, Geo. U. L. Center), Adam J. Levitin

Testimony Before Congress

The results to date from MHAP are deeply disappointing. Even the most optimistic view of HAMP and HARP’s potential would now project the programs as having only a minor impact on the foreclosure crisis. Until and unless the problems of unemployment; negative equity, and servicer capacity, incentives, and contract restrictions are addressed, we are unlikely to see noticeably different results. These issues cannot be addressed within the current structure of HAMP.

Unfortunately, none of the solutions for foreclosures due to unemployment are particularly satisfying, and without addressing unemployment, foreclosures will remain at elevated levels. Bankruptcy presents possible solutions to negative …

Worsening Foreclosure Crisis: Is It Time To Reconsider Bankruptcy Reform?: Hearing Before The Subcomm. On Administrative Oversight And The Courts Of The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 111th Cong., July 23, 2009 (Statement Of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Adam J. Levitin

Testimony Before Congress

The clear finding from my research is that mortgage prices are largely insensitive to bankruptcy modification risk. Permitting bankruptcy modification is unlikely to result in higher mortgage costs or lower mortgage credit availability.

The foreclosure crisis is not about to stop any time soon. Judicially-supervised restructuring of mortgages is the only tool we have left in the box. It's a tool we know can work. It's a tool that can save hundreds of thousands of families their homes and help stabilize communities, housing markets, and the economy. It's time to use it.

H.R. 200, The "Helping Families Save Their Homes In Bankruptcy Act Of 2009," And H.R. 225, The "Emergency Homeownership And Equity Protection Act": Hearing Before The H. Comm. On The Judiciary, 111th Cong., Jan. 22, 2009 (Statement Of Associate Professor Adam J. Levitin, Geo. U. L. Center), Adam J. Levitin

Testimony Before Congress

Permitting modification of all mortgages in bankruptcy would create a low-cost, effective, fair, and immediately available method for resolving much of the current foreclosure crisis without imposing costs on taxpayers, creating a moral hazard for borrowers or lenders, or increasing mortgage credit costs or decreasing mortgage credit availability. As the foreclosure crisis deepens, bankruptcy modification presents the best and least invasive method of stabilizing the housing market and is a crucial step in stabilizing financial markets.

Helping Families Save Their Homes: The Role Of Bankruptcy Law: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 110th Cong., Nov. 19, 2008 (Statement Of Professor Adam Levitin, Geo. U. L. Center), Adam J. Levitin

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.