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The Clean Air Act Of 1963: Postwar Environmental Politics And The Debate Over Federal Power, Adam D. Orford Jul 2021

The Clean Air Act Of 1963: Postwar Environmental Politics And The Debate Over Federal Power, Adam D. Orford

Scholarly Works

This Article explores the development of the Clean Air Act of 1963, the first law to allow the federal government to fight air pollution rather than study it. The Article focuses on the postwar years (1945-1963) and explores the rise of public health medical research, cooperative federalism, and the desire to harness the powers of the federal government for domestic social improvement, as key precursors to environmental law. It examines the origins of the idea that the federal government should "do something" about air pollution, and how that idea was translated, through drafting, lobbying, politicking, hearings, debate, influence, and votes ...


Chevron Abroad, Kent H. Barnett, Lindsey Vinson Jan 2020

Chevron Abroad, Kent H. Barnett, Lindsey Vinson

Scholarly Works

This Article presents our comparative findings of how courts in five other countries review agency statutory interpretation. These comparisons permit us to understand and participate better in current debates about the increasingly controversial Chevron doctrine in American law, whereby courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes that an agency administers. Those debates concern, among other things, Chevron 's purported inevitability, functioning and normative propriety. Our inquiry into judicial review in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia provides useful and unexpected findings. Chevron, contrary to some scholars' views, is not inevitable because only one of these countries has ...


Some Kind Of Hearing Officer, Kent H. Barnett Jan 2019

Some Kind Of Hearing Officer, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

In his prominent 1975 law-review article, “Some Kind of Hearing,” Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly explored how courts (and agencies) should respond when the Due Process Clause required, in the Supreme Court’s exceedingly vague words, “some kind of hearing.” That phrase led to the familiar (if unhelpful) Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, in which courts weigh three factors to determine how much process or formality is due. But the Supreme Court has never applied Mathews to another, often ignored facet of due process—the requirement for impartial adjudicators. As it turns out, Congress and agencies have broad discretion to ...


Towards Optimal Enforcement, Kent H. Barnett Jan 2019

Towards Optimal Enforcement, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

In Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, Professor Michael Sant'Ambrogio argues that a hybrid private/public enforcement model in agency proceedings may provide the best hope of achieving optimal federal law enforcement. In other words, a blunderbuss approach of choosing public enforcement or private enforcement (whether in judicial or agency proceedings) is unlikely to prove ideal. He identifies various tools--such as agencies' role in the review or initiation of proceedings, or the use of class-wide proceedings--that Congress or agencies can use to calibrate agency enforcement to its optimal design. I consider three additional tools that may optimize enforcement goals with ...


Due Process For Article Iii—Rethinking Murray's Lessee, Kent H. Barnett Jan 2019

Due Process For Article Iii—Rethinking Murray's Lessee, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

The Founders sought to protect federal judges’ impartiality primarily because those judges would review the political branches’ actions. To that end, Article III judges retain their offices during “good behaviour,” and Congress cannot reduce their compensation while they are in office. But Article III has taken a curious turn. Article III generally does not prohibit Article I courts or agencies from deciding “public rights” cases, i.e., when the government is a party and seeking to vindicate its own actions and interpretations under federal law against a private party. In contrast, Article III courts generally must resolve cases that concern ...


Judge Kavanaugh, Chevron Deference, And The Supreme Court, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker Sep 2018

Judge Kavanaugh, Chevron Deference, And The Supreme Court, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker

Popular Media

How might a new U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh review federal agency statutory interpretations that come before him on the Court?

To find at least a preliminary answer, we can look to his judicial behavior while serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit—and there is plenty of relevant Kavanaugh judicial behavior to observe. Since starting his service on the D.C. Circuit in 2006, Judge Kavanaugh has participated in the disposition of around 2,700 cases and has authored more than 300 opinions. Over a third of those authored opinions involved ...


Non-Alj Adjudicators In Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, And Removal, Kent H. Barnett, Russell Wheeler Jan 2018

Non-Alj Adjudicators In Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, And Removal, Kent H. Barnett, Russell Wheeler

Scholarly Works

This article republishes—in substantively similar form—our 2018 report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) concerning federal agencies’ adjudicators who are not administrative law judges (ALJs). (We refer to these adjudicators as “non-ALJ Adjudicators” or “non-ALJs.”) As our data indicate, non-ALJs significantly outnumber ALJs. Yet non-ALJs are often overlooked and difficult to discuss as a class because of their disparate titles and characteristics. To obtain more information on non-ALJs, we surveyed agencies on non-ALJs’ hearings and, among other things, the characteristics concerning non-ALJs’ salaries, selection, oversight, and removal. We first present our reported data on these ...


Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam Legislation, Randy Beck Jan 2018

Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam Legislation, Randy Beck

Scholarly Works

For hundreds of years prior to ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Anglo-American legislatures used qui tam legislation to enforce legal constraints on government officials. A qui tam statute allows a private informer to collect a statutory fine for illegal conduct, even if the informer lacks the particularized injury normally required for Article III standing. This essay explores whether qui tam regulation should be revived as a means of ensuring executive branch legal accountability."


Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker Jan 2018

Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing Chevron deference—a two-step inquiry under which courts defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies administer. Much of the debate centers on either Chevron’s domain (i.e., when Chevron should apply at all) or how courts ascertain statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Largely lost in this debate on constraining agency discretion is the role of Chevron’s second step: whether the agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Drawing on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in the ...


Administrative Law's Political Dynamics, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker Jan 2018

Administrative Law's Political Dynamics, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. commanded courts to uphold federal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes as long as those interpretations are reasonable. This Chevron deference doctrine was based in part on the Court’s desire to temper administrative law’s political dynamics by vesting federal agencies, not courts, with primary authority to make policy judgments about ambiguous laws Congress charged the agencies to administer. Despite this express objective, scholars such as Frank Cross, Emerson Tiller, and Cass Sunstein have empirically documented how politics influence circuit court ...


How Laws Are Made: The Administrative Agencies, Sharon Bradley Oct 2017

How Laws Are Made: The Administrative Agencies, Sharon Bradley

Presentations

Law, as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, is “a body of rules of action or conduct prescribed by controlling authority and having binding legal force.” Our laws come from our three branches of Government: legislative, executive, and judicial. These webinars will focus on the law-making activities of each branch, the documents that are created during the process, and how they are used by lawyers and legal researchers.

Administrative agencies are part of the executive branch of Government headed by the President. They make laws through the rule-making process, but they also enforce the rules and have quasi-judicial power.


Looking More Closely At The Platypus Of Formal Rulemaking, Kent H. Barnett May 2017

Looking More Closely At The Platypus Of Formal Rulemaking, Kent H. Barnett

Popular Media

Professor Kent Barnett argues that the oft-criticized formal rulemaking process has virtues in proper settings.


Short-Circuiting The New Major Questions Doctrine, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker Jan 2017

Short-Circuiting The New Major Questions Doctrine, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

In Minor Courts, Major Questions, Michael Coenen and Seth Davis advance perhaps the most provocative proposal to date to address the new major questions doctrine articulated in King v. Burwell. They argue that the Supreme Court alone should identify “major questions” that deprive agencies of interpretive primacy, prohibiting the doctrine’s use in the lower courts. Although we agree that the Court provided little guidance about the doctrine’s scope in King v. Burwell, we are unpersuaded that the solution to this lack of guidance is to limit its doctrinal development to one court that hears fewer than eighty cases ...


How The Supreme Court Derailed Formal Rulemaking, Kent H. Barnett Jan 2017

How The Supreme Court Derailed Formal Rulemaking, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

Based on archival research, this Essay explores the untold story of how the Supreme Court in the 1970s largely ended “formal” trial-like rulemaking by federal agencies in two railway cases. In the first, nearly forgotten decision, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., the Court held sua sponte that an agency was not required to use formal rulemaking, despite its significant historical provenance. That unpersuasive decision all but decided the second, better-known decision, United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, the following term. In response to both decisions, agencies abandoned formal rulemaking—one of only four broad categories of agency action ...


Dictation And Delegation In Securities Regulation, Usha Rodrigues Jan 2017

Dictation And Delegation In Securities Regulation, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

When Congress undertakes major financial reform, either it dictates the precise contours of the law itself or it delegates the bulk of the rulemaking to an administrative agency. This choice has critical consequences. Making the law self-executing in federal legislation is swift, not subject to administrative tinkering, and less vulnerable than rulemaking to judicial second-guessing. Agency action is, in contrast, deliberate, subject to ongoing bureaucratic fiddling and more vulnerable than statutes to judicial challenge.

This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the extent of congressional delegation in securities law from 1970 to the present day, examining nine pieces of ...


Chevron In The Circuit Courts, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker Jan 2017

Chevron In The Circuit Courts, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

This Article presents findings from the most comprehensive empirical study to date on how the federal courts of appeals have applied Chevron deference—the doctrine under which courts defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it administers. Based on 1,558 agency interpretations the circuit courts reviewed from 2003 through 2013 (where they cited Chevron), we found that the circuit courts overall upheld 71% of interpretations and applied Chevron deference 77% of the time. But there was nearly a twenty-five-percentage-point difference in agency-win rates when the circuit courts applied Chevron deference than when they ...


Against Administrative Judges, Kent H. Barnett Jun 2016

Against Administrative Judges, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

The single largest cadre of federal adjudicators goes largely ignored by scholars, policymakers, courts, and even litigating parties. These Administrative Judges or “AJs,” often confused with well-known federal Administrative Law Judges or “ALJs,” operate by the thousands in numerous federal agencies. Yet unlike ALJs, the significantly more numerous AJs preside over less formal hearings and have no significant statutory protections to preserve their impartiality. The national press has recently called attention to the alleged unfairness of certain ALJ proceedings, and regulated parties have successfully enjoined agencies’ use of ALJs. While fixes are necessary for ALJ adjudication, any solution that ignores ...


Standing For (And Up To) Separation Of Powers, Kent H. Barnett Apr 2016

Standing For (And Up To) Separation Of Powers, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

The U.S. Constitution requires federal agencies to comply with separation-of-powers (or structural) safeguards, such as by obtaining valid appointments, exercising certain limited powers, and being sufficiently subject to the President’s control. Who can best protect these safeguards? A growing number of scholars call for allowing only the political branches — Congress and the President — to defend them. These scholars would limit or end judicial review because private judicial challenges are aberrant to justiciability doctrine and lead courts to meddle in minor matters that rarely effect regulatory outcomes.

This Article defends the right of private parties to assert justiciable structural ...


Beyond Absurd: Jim Thorpe And A Proposed Taxonomy For The Absurdity Doctrine, Hillel Y. Levin, Joshua M. Segal, Keisha N. Stanford Jan 2016

Beyond Absurd: Jim Thorpe And A Proposed Taxonomy For The Absurdity Doctrine, Hillel Y. Levin, Joshua M. Segal, Keisha N. Stanford

Scholarly Works

In light of the Third Circuit's recent decision interpreting the Native American Graves Repatriation Act, this Article argues that the Supreme Court must clarify the Absurdity Doctrine of statutory interpretation. The Article offers a framework for doing so.


Why Bias Challenges To Administrative Adjudication Should Succeed, Kent H. Barnett Jan 2016

Why Bias Challenges To Administrative Adjudication Should Succeed, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

How much confidence would you have in a judge whom your opponent hired, can pay bonuses to, and can seek to discipline or remove? I recently argued that numerous administrative adjudicators very likely suffer from an unconstitutional appearance of partiality because the agencies that are often parties in administrative hearings can hire, pay bonuses to, discipline, and remove these adjudicators.

In this Article for the Missouri Law Review’s Symposium on A Future Without the Administrative State?, I contend that challenges to adjudicators’ appearance of partiality are well positioned to be part of the new wave of structural challenges to ...


Due Process Vs. Administrative Law, Kent H. Barnett Nov 2015

Due Process Vs. Administrative Law, Kent H. Barnett

Popular Media

This article by Professor Kent Barnett was published in the Wall Street Journal on November 16, 2015. It discusses the Securities and Exchange Commission recently coming under fire for pressuring its in-house administrative-law judges to rule in its favor during agency enforcement proceedings.


Codifying Chevmore, Kent H. Barnett Apr 2015

Codifying Chevmore, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

This Article considers the significance and promise of Congress’s unprecedented codification of the well-known Chevron and Skidmore judicial-deference doctrines (to which I refer collectively as “Chevmore”). Congress did so in the Dodd-Frank Act by instructing courts to apply the Skidmore deference factors when reviewing certain agency-preemption decisions and by referring to Chevron throughout.

This codification is meaningful because it informs the delegation theory that undergirds Chevmore (i.e., that Congress intends to delegate interpretive primacy over statutory interpretation to agencies under Chevron or courts under Skidmore). Scholars and at least three Supreme Court Justices have decried the judicial inquiry ...


Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise With Chevmore Codification, Kent H. Barnett Nov 2014

Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise With Chevmore Codification, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

After nearly thirty years, the judicially crafted Chevron and Skidmore judicial-review doctrines have found new life as exotic, yet familiar, legislative tools. When Chevron deference applies, courts employ two steps: they consider whether the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous, and, if so, they defer to an administering agency’s reasonable interpretation. Skidmore deference, in contrast, is a less deferential regime in which courts assume interpretative primacy over statutory ambiguities but defer to agency action based on four factors — the agency’s thoroughness, reasoning, consistency, and overall persuasiveness. In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress directed ...


The Challenge Of Seeing Justice Done In Removal Proceedings, Jason A. Cade Nov 2014

The Challenge Of Seeing Justice Done In Removal Proceedings, Jason A. Cade

Scholarly Works

Prosecutorial discretion is a critical part of the administration of immigration law. This Article considers the work and responsibilities of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) trial attorneys, who thus far have not attracted significant scholarly attention, despite playing a large role in the ground-level implementation of immigration law and policy. The Article makes three main contributions. First, I consider whether ICE attorneys have a duty to help ensure that the removal system achieves justice, rather than indiscriminately seek removal in every case and by any means necessary. As I demonstrate, trial attorneys have concrete obligations derived from statutory provisions ...


To The Victor Goes The Toil -- Remedies For Regulated Parties In Separation-Of-Powers Litigation, Kent H. Barnett Jan 2014

To The Victor Goes The Toil -- Remedies For Regulated Parties In Separation-Of-Powers Litigation, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

The U.S. Constitution imposes three key limits on the design of federal agencies. It constrains how agency officers are appointed, the extent of their independence from the President, and the range of issues that they can decide. Scholars have trumpeted the importance of these safeguards with soaring rhetoric. And the Supreme Court has permitted regulated parties to vindicate these safeguards through implied private rights of action under the Constitution. Regulated parties, for their part, have been successfully challenging agency structure with increased frequency. At the same time, regulated parties, courts, and scholars have largely ignored the practical question of ...


The Law Professor As Faculty Athletics Representative: Some Random Thoughts After Two Years, David E. Shipley Apr 2013

The Law Professor As Faculty Athletics Representative: Some Random Thoughts After Two Years, David E. Shipley

Scholarly Works

It is a pleasure to write an essay about something I really enjoy, and it is especially pleasing not to worry about footnotes. I have been a law professor since 1977, and in August 2012, I started my 35th year of teaching. It is still fun to be in the classroom; my students energize me, teaching remains a challenge and being a productive scholar is important. I am one of those professors who likes his law school, university and professional service commitments. I am fortunate to have the best job in higher education: being a tenured law professor. My service ...


Resolving The Alj Quandary, Kent H. Barnett Mar 2013

Resolving The Alj Quandary, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

Three competing constitutional and practical concerns surround federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”), who preside over all formal adjudications within the executive branch. First, if ALJs are “inferior Officers” (not mere employees), as five current Supreme Court Justices have suggested, the current method of selecting many ALJs likely violates the Appointments Clause. Second, a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision reserved the question whether the statutory protections that prevent ALJs from being fired at will impermissibly impinge upon the President’s supervisory power under Article II. Third, these same protections from removal may, on the other hand, be too limited to ...


Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, Kent H. Barnett May 2012

Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Congress’ use of two layers of tenure protection to shield Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) members from the President’s removal. The SEC could appoint and remove PCAOB members. An implied tenure-protection provision protected the SEC from the President’s at-will removal. And a statutory tenure-protection provision protected PCAOB members from the SEC’s at-will removal. The Court held that these “tiered” tenure protections unconstitutionally impinged upon the President’s removal power because they prevented the President from holding the SEC responsible for ...


The Chevron Two-Step In Georgia's Administrative Law, David Shipley Jan 2012

The Chevron Two-Step In Georgia's Administrative Law, David Shipley

Scholarly Works

The Georgia Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have long accepted the General Assembly’s authority to enact legislation that establishes administrative agencies and empowers those agencies to promulgate rules and regulations to implement their enabling statutes. In addition, the Georgia Constitution provides that the General Assembly may authorize agencies to exercise quasi-judicial powers. Administrative agencies with broad powers enjoy a secure position under Georgia law.

Like federal and state administrative agencies throughout the nation, Georgia’s many boards, commissions and authorities make policy when they apply their governing statutes in promulgating regulations of general applicability, and in ruling on ...


The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Appointment With Trouble, Kent H. Barnett Jun 2011

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Appointment With Trouble, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

This article considers whether the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Director’s appointment of the Bureau’s Deputy Director comports with the Appointments Clause. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act established the Bureau in July 2010, as well as the offices of the Bureau’s Director and Deputy Director, to coordinate the regulation and enforcement of federal consumer-financial-protection laws. Under that act, the Director appoints the Deputy Director. The Appointments Clause permits “Heads of Departments” to appoint inferior officers like the Deputy Director. But it is unclear if the Bureau is a “department” and thus if the Director ...