Law Commons^™

Reframing Financial Regulation, Charles K. Whitehead

Charles K Whitehead

Financial regulation today is largely framed by traditional business categories. The financial markets, however, have begun to bypass those categories, principally over the last thirty years. Chief among the changes has been convergence in the products and services offered by traditional intermediaries and new market entrants, as well as a shift in capital-raising and risk-bearing from traditional intermediation to the capital markets. The result has been the reintroduction of old problems addressed by (but now beyond the reach of) current regulation, and the rise of new problems that reflect change in how capital and financial risk can now be managed …

The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, Charles K. Whitehead

Charles K Whitehead

The Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading by banking entities - in effect, reintroducing to the financial markets a substantial portion of the Glass-Steagall Act’s static divide between banks and securities firms. This Article argues that the Glass-Steagall model is a fixture of the past - a financial Maginot Line within an evolving financial system. To be effective, new financial regulation must reflect new relationships in the marketplace. For the Volcker Rule, those relationships include a growing reliance by banks on new market participants to conduct traditional banking functions. Proprietary trading has moved to less-regulated businesses, in many cases, to hedge …

Fiduciary Duties For Activist Shareholders, Iman Anabtawi, Lynn Stout

Lynn A. Stout

Corporate law and scholarship generally assume that professional managers control public corporations, while shareholders play only a weak and passive role. As a result, corporate officers and directors are understood to be subject to extensive fiduciary duties, while shareholders traditionally have been thought to have far more limited obligations. Outside the contexts of controlling shareholders and closely held firms, many experts argue shareholders have no duties at all. The most important trend in corporate governance today, however, is the move toward "shareholder democracy." Changes in financial markets, in business practice, and in corporate law have given minority shareholders in public …

Activist Investors, Distressed Companies, And Value Uncertainty, Michelle M. Harner, Jamie Marincic Griffin, Jennifer Ivey-Crickenberger

Michelle M. Harner

Hedge funds, private equity firms, and other alternative investment funds are frequently key players in corporate restructurings. Most commentators agree that the presence of a fund can change the dynamics of a chapter 11 case. They cannot agree, however, on the impact of this change—i.e., do funds create or destroy enterprise value? This essay contributes to the dialogue by analyzing data from chapter 11 cases in which funds are in a position to influence the debtor’s exit strategy. The data shed light on what such funds might achieve in chapter 11 cases and the potential implications for debtors and their …

Iosco's Response To The Financial Crisis, Roberta S. Karmel

Roberta S. Karmel

ABSTRACT FOR IOSCO’S RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS BY ROBERTA S. KARMEL, Centennial Professor, Brooklyn Law School Like other international financial bodies, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has responded to the financial crisis of 2008. IOSCO thus revised its Objectives and Principles and added eight new Principles, including two that specifically focused on systemic risk. IOSCO’s ongoing efforts to support these new Principles are parallel to efforts by other financial regulators to deal with systemic risk. Yet, IOSCO’s efforts focus on somewhat different issues in the capital markets than the issues of interest to bank regulators. This Article …

Should Ad Hoc Committees Have Fiduciary Duties?: Judicial Regulation Of The Bankruptcy Market, David L. Perechocky

David L Perechocky

This article is the first to substantively and directly address the question of whether informal creditor groups in bankruptcy cases could and should have fiduciary duties to other creditors. The rise of activist investors and claims traders in bankruptcy proceedings has significantly changed the bankruptcy process, to much controversy. One particularly contentious topic is the growing presence of informal, or “ad hoc,” creditor groups. Proponents argue that these groups are beneficial by enabling creditors to work together efficiently and effectively, but critics view their actions as disruptive and often unfair to other creditors. A recent decision in the Washington Mutual …

The Hedge Fund Explosion: Is The Bang Worth The Buck?, Arindam Bandopadhyaya, James L. Grant

James L. Grant

Any casual following of the financial news would reveal that hedge funds have experienced phenomenal growth, especially over the last fifteen years. In terms of numbers, there were an estimated 8000 hedge funds in 2005, up from only 500 in 1990. During this fifteen-year period assets under management have grown from an estimated $50 billion to $1.5 trillion. Moreover, the hedgefund industry has spawned a “fund of funds” business, which has slowly become the preferred way of investing in hedge funds, especially for institutional investors. Today, the number of these combination funds is estimated at about 4000. Until recently, hedge …

Testimony Before The U.S. House Of Representatives, Committee On Agriculture - “Potential Excessive Speculation In Commodity Markets: The Impact Of Proposed Legislation", Michael Greenberger

Michael Greenberger

Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Agriculture. 110th Congress, 2nd Session (July 10-11, 2008).

Controlling Creditor Opportunism, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper addresses problems of creditor opportunism. “Distress investors” such as hedge funds, private equity funds, and investment banks are opportunistic when they use debt to obtain control of a financially troubled firm and extract improper gains at the expense of the firm and its other stakeholders. Examples include the mis-use of private information to short-sell a borrower’s securities and creditor self-dealing.

Creditors can act opportunistically because legal doctrines that historically checked such behavior—e.g., “lender liability”—have not kept pace with fundamental changes in the market for control of distressed firms. The recent Dodd-Frank financial reform is not likely to change …

Where Have All The Lenders Gone?: "Loan To Own Transactions" In The Current Credit Market, Stephanie A. Nadler

Stephanie A Nadler

Credit is not readily available in current markets. While distressed firms are in dire need of capital contributions, traditional lenders are not willing to make risky loans. Distressed firms have turned to hedge funds as lenders for much-needed capital. Thus, hedge funds engage in “loan to own” transactions, a lending technique that has recently drawn much criticism. In a loan to own transaction, the hedge fund makes a loan to a distressed company, while also taking an equity stake in the company. Pursuant to such activity, the hedge fund will generally gain a seat on the board of directors or …

The Tie Between Hedge Funds And Financial Stability: Is The Current Financial Crisis A Call For Regulation?, Domenico Ferrari

Domenico Ferrari

The attitude of regulatory authorities towards hedge funds has been severely affected by the current international financial crisis. The international financial crisis, and the need to develop a brand new regulatory framework to address the current failures, urges a solution for the problem of what degree of regulation should be required for hedge funds. At the same time, the mistake of over-regulation, by using hedge funds as an easy scapegoat for a crisis caused by many different shortcomings and several regulatory loopholes, should be avoided. The examples of the U.S. and Singapore regulatory experience with hedge funds show that the …

Trading Places: Securities Regulation, Market Crisis, And Network Risk, Olufunmilayo B. Arewa

Olufunmilayo B. Arewa

The rising power of traders has fundamentally transformed financial market networks and risks. Further, the increased complexity of traded securities and trading strategies within financial networks has magnified shortcomings of existing industry risk management practices as well as dominant regulatory regimes. Financial markets are ultimately places where people trade. Broader social and technological changes have altered the nature of trading activities in financial markets. Innovations in technology, financial instruments, and trading strategies have increased financial market efficiency but have also transformed sources of financial market risks. Financial market networks heighten the need for fundamental rethinking of financial market regulation and …

The Shadow Bankruptcy System, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This article exposes and explores a puzzle at the heart of the current economic crisis: The surprising under-use, and increasing misuse, of Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, the principal legal system for salvaging troubled businesses.

The answer offered here: The rise of the shadow bankruptcy system. “Shadow bankruptcy” describes the severely under-regulated non-bank financial institutions (e.g., hedge funds, private equity funds and investment banks) that increasingly dominate and manipulate Chapter 11 reorganizations.

Like the “shadow banking” system for which it is named, shadow bankruptcy thrives on and promotes opacity and undisclosed, possibly perverse, incentives. Shadow bankruptcy players …

Failure's Futures: Controlling The Market For Information In Corporate Reorganization, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This Article identifies and explores an important gap in bankruptcy theory and policy, with significant implications for the coming wave of major business failures: How to manage information about financially distressed businesses?

The paper makes three claims. First, Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code plays a unique informational role, as it creates mechanisms to explain a debtor’s failure and to promote reinvestment. Second, the information functions performed by this system face internal and external threats. Internally, bankruptcy reorganization increasingly resembles an unregulated securities market, dominated by sophisticated, wealthy investors whose motives and strategies are often highly opaque. Their …

Mutual Funds, Hedge Funds, And The Public-Private Dichotomy In A Macrosociological Framework For Law, Larry D. Barnett

Larry D Barnett

Macrosociology considers law to be one of the institutions of society and, hence, a fundamental component of a social system. Four macrosociological propositions underlie the instant paper: (i) the institutions comprising a social system are, in the long term, compatible with one another; (ii) the compatibility of institutions involves, inter alia, concepts that are similar or identical across at least some institutions; (iii) the concepts and doctrines of the institution of law manifest the properties, including the central values, of the social system; and (iv) the properties of the social system are fashioned by system-level forces. Because the propositions are …

Dr. Jones And The Raiders Of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund Regulation, Part Ii, John W. Verret

John W Verret

Hedge funds can sometimes achieve remarkable returns. The market fees exceed that of other asset classes, leading some fund managers to engage in illicit behavior, including fraud, that violates their duty to their investors and tempts institutional investors to violate their fiduciary duty to their principals. I will examine the hedge fund registration requirement struck down during the summer of 2006, as well as the tools used by other regulators to oversee institutional investors. This study relies on a survey of literature on financial regulation, commentary on the hedge fund registration rule, models of self-regulation, and examples in other areas …