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Articles 1 - 27 of 27
Full-Text Articles in Law
Procedures For Challenging Arbitrators: Lessons For And From Taiwan, Winnie Ma
Procedures For Challenging Arbitrators: Lessons For And From Taiwan, Winnie Ma
Winnie Ma
The parties to arbitration may challenge their arbitrators for genuine reasons, such as lack of impartiality, independence or competence. However, the parties may also misuse or abuse the challenge procedures as dilatory (and even as guerrilla) tactics. Ideally, the procedures for challenging arbitrators should uphold arbitral integrity and legitimacy without unduly compromising arbitral expediency and efficiency. This article explores two controversies concerning the arbitrator challenge procedures. First, who should decide on the challenge - the arbitral tribunal including or excluding the challenged arbitrators, or a separate and neutral entity such as an arbitral institution? Second, should the arbitral proceedings continue …
Conflict In The Court? Supreme Court Recusal From Marbury To The Modern Day, James Sample
Conflict In The Court? Supreme Court Recusal From Marbury To The Modern Day, James Sample
James Sample
For justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, controversies pitting personal conflicts ¬¬— whether actual or merely alleged — against the constitutional commitment to the rule of law increasingly form the basis of a caustic and circular national dialogue that generates substantially more heat than light. While the profile of these controversies is undoubtedly waxing, the underlying tensions stretch back at least to Marbury v. Madison. For all its seminal import, in Marbury, Chief Justice John Marshall adjudicated a case involving, inter alia, the validity of judicial commissions Marshall had himself signed and sealed while serving simultaneously as the outgoing Secretary …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In American Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In American Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging in the United States, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly comparative criminal-procedure literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in American prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge that do not exist in their counterparts overseas. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of American prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct in the United States, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In American Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In American Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging in the United States, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly comparative criminal-procedure literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in American prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge that do not exist in their counterparts overseas. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of American prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct in the United States, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging in the United States, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly comparative criminal-procedure literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in American prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge that do not exist in their counterparts overseas. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of American prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct in the United States, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
Resolving Client Conflicts By Hiring "Conflicts Counsel", Ronald D. Rotunda
Resolving Client Conflicts By Hiring "Conflicts Counsel", Ronald D. Rotunda
Ronald D. Rotunda
A general principle of legal ethics is that a law firm may not represent a client suing someone who is also a client of the law firm (1) even though the two matters are unrelated, (2) a different law firm represents the client in that law suit, and (3) there is no risk that the lawyer would violate the confidences of any client. Other ethics rules magnify the significance of this rule by imputing the disqualification of every lawyer in the law firm to every other lawyer in the same firm. Courts enforce these rules by disqualifying the offending law …
Judicial Disqualification In The Aftermath Of Caperton V. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Ronald D. Rotunda
Judicial Disqualification In The Aftermath Of Caperton V. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Ronald D. Rotunda
Ronald D. Rotunda
Does Due Process require a judge to disqualify himself if an individual spent independent funds to buy ads that criticized the judge's opponent in a judicial election? The Supreme Court said yes (5 to 4) in the Caperton decision, and thus has created more uncertainty in the law. Does it matter if the person who paid for the independent ads was not a lawyer or a party but was only an employee of the party? And, does it matter if that employee's financial interest in the law suit (if one were to pierce the corporate veil) is minor – substantially …
The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits On Independent Research, Beth Thornburg
The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits On Independent Research, Beth Thornburg
Beth Thornburg
Appellate judges in the twenty-first century find themselves in a world in which litigation – both civil and criminal -- involves a vast array of complex and technical factual disputes. These lawsuits, in turn, may cause judges to seek a greater level of expertise in order to deal competently with the evidence that will be relevant to the disputes. At the same time, advances in communication technology have brought the world’s library to the courthouse, requiring no onerous trips across town or index searches but only the click of a mouse. When judges feel the need for additional information, the …
Section 236 Of The Insolvency Act And Directors' Disqualification, Adrian Walters
Section 236 Of The Insolvency Act And Directors' Disqualification, Adrian Walters
Adrian J Walters
No abstract provided.
Directors' Disqualification After The Insolvency Act 2000, 2001, Adrian Walters
Directors' Disqualification After The Insolvency Act 2000, 2001, Adrian Walters
Adrian J Walters
No abstract provided.
Bare Undertakings In Directors' Disqualification Proceedings, Adrian Walters
Bare Undertakings In Directors' Disqualification Proceedings, Adrian Walters
Adrian J Walters
No abstract provided.
Directors' Duties: The Impact Of The Company Directors Disqualification Act, Adrian Walters
Directors' Duties: The Impact Of The Company Directors Disqualification Act, Adrian Walters
Adrian J Walters
No abstract provided.