Law Commons^™

Contract Damages, Moral Agency, And Henry James’ The Ambassadors, Jennifer Nadler

Jennifer Nadler

This paper enters the dispute over the proper interpretation of the expectation measure of damages in contract law. Should damages be measured by the plaintiff’s financial loss or by the cost of acquiring a substitute performance (“cost of cure”)? I begin by presenting a moral (as opposed to an economic or a pragmatic) justification for the traditional contract principle that a plaintiff has a right to compensation for the financial loss flowing from breach but no right to performance. I do so by showing that implicit in the principle that the plaintiff has a right to compensation for financial loss …

The Law Of Society: Governance Through Contract, Peter Zumbansen

Peer Zumbansen

This paper focuses on contract law as a central field in contemporary regulatory practice. In recent years, "governance by contract" has emerged as the central concept in the context of privatization, domestic and transnational commercial relations, and law-and-development projects. Meanwhile, as a result of the neo-formalist attack on contract law, "governance of contract" through contract adjudication, consumer protection law, and judicial intervention into private law relations has come under severe pressure. Building on early historical critique of the formalist foundations of an allegedly private law of the market, the paper assesses the current justifications for contractual governance and posits that …

A Defense Of Judicial Reconstruction Of Contracts, Mark P. Gergen

Mark P. Gergen

No abstract provided.

Contract Theory And The Failures Of Public-Private Contracting, Wendy Netter Epstein

Wendy Netter Epstein

The market for public-private contracting is huge and flawed. Public-private contracts for services such as prisons and welfare administration tend to result in cost savings at the sacrifice of quality service. For instance, to cut costs, private prisons skimp on security. Public law scholars have studied these problems for decades and have proposed various public law solutions. But the literature is incomplete because it does not approach the problem through a commercial lens. This Article fills that gap. It considers how economic analysis of contract law, in particular efficiency theory and agency theory, bear upon the unique problems of public-private …

Promises, Trust, And Contract Law, Anthony J. Bellia

Anthony J. Bellia

The need for individuals to be able to trust that promises will be performed is central to justifying a law that renders certain promises enforceable. This Article argues that the legal enforcement of certain promises to meet this need does not necessarily diminish the personal relationships of trust in which such promises are made, as has been argued. Rather, this Article argues, the making and performance of legally enforceable promises can assist individuals in building relationships of trust, as it assists them in the pursuit of myriad goods.

Contracting With Electronic Agents, Anthony J. Bellia

Anthony J. Bellia

Established contract doctrine provides no clear answer to the question whether exchanges arranged by the interaction of electronic agents are enforceable. This Article explores whether the law should enforce exchanges arranged by the interaction of electronic agents. It examine how normative theories of contractual obligation inform the issue, with an eye toward the strengths and weaknesses of each theory. The theories that most strongly support the enforcement of exchanges arranged by electronic agents, this Article explains, are those that ground contractual obligation in protecting the ability of individuals to pursue their reasonable objectives through reliable arrangements.

The Cost Of Consent: Optimal Standardization In The Law Of Contract, Joshua A.T. Fairfield

Joshua A.T. Fairfield

This article argues that informed consent to contract terms is not a good to be maximized, but is rather an information cost that courts should minimize. The goal of mass-market contract law ought to be to keep costs low by encouraging contract standardization. The article applies information cost theory to show that information-forcing rules are often inefficient at both the micro- and macroeconomic levels. Such rules also impose greater costs on third parties than the benefits they create for the contracting parties. When one consumer creates an idiosyncratic deal, the information-savings benefits of standardization are reduced for all other potential …

Contract Theory And The Failures Of Public-Private Contracting (Forthcoming), Wendy Netter Epstein

Wendy Netter Epstein

The market for public-private contracting is huge and flawed. Public-private contracts for services such as prisons and welfare administration tend to result in cost savings at the sacrifice of quality service. For instance, to cut costs, private prisons skimp on security. Public law scholars have studied these problems for decades and have proposed various public law solutions. But the literature is incomplete because it does not approach the problem through a commercial lens. This Article fills that gap. It considers how economic analysis of contract law, in particular efficiency theory and agency theory, bear upon the unique problems of public-private …

Building Bio-Based Supply Chains: Theoretical Perspectives On Innovative Contract Design, A. Bryan Endres, Jody M. Endres, Jeremy J. Stoller

A. Bryan Endres

By 2030, the United States will consume over 300 million tons of forest and agricultural feedstocks for energy production. The supply chain necessary to provide unprecedented quantities of new “bioenergy crops,” however, is fraught with uncertainty. The vertically integrated model the nascent sector currently uses may have limited opportunity for expansion to meet renewable energy mandates. A hybrid structure is likely to emerge as the industry evolves, in which end-users closely cooperate with a large number of heterogeneous producers through long-term contracting rather than as direct owners or operators of biomass farms. This “vertically coordinated” industry model is dependent on …

La Voluntad En Los Contratos De Adhesión: Sociología Y Crítica Jurídica, Con Énfasis En El Análisis Económico Del Derecho / The Consent Theory Critique And Standard Form Contracts In Civil Law (With Special Reference To Law And Economics), Andres Palacios Lleras

Andrés Palacios Lleras

El presente artículo tiene como propósito sugerir los elementos básicos para (re)construir una doctrina diferente sobre la interpretación de los contratos de adhesión en Colombia, basada en las ideas de Josserand y en literatura contemporánea sobre análisis económico del derecho. La tesis que se argumenta sugiere que dichos contratos deben interpretarse teniendo en mente tanto las característias cognitivas de los adherentes, como el desequilirio de poder negocial que subyace su relación con los oferentes, y sugiere que las normas potestativas sólo puedan ser cambiadas a favor de la parte adherente.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the connections …

Strategic Default: The Popularization Of A Debate Among Contract Scholars, Meredith R. Miller

Meredith R. Miller

A June 2010 report estimates that roughly 20% of mortgage defaults in the first half of 2009 were “strategic.” “Strategic default” describes the situation where a home borrower has the financial ability to continue to pay her mortgage but chooses not to pay and walks away. The ubiquity of strategic default has lead to innumerable newspaper articles, blog posts, website comments and editorial musings on the morality of homeowners who can afford to pay but choose, instead, to walk away. This Article centers on the current public discourse concerning strategic default, which mirrors a continuing debate among scholars regarding whether …

Contract As Convention, F. H. Buckley

F. H. Buckley

Contract theory is a curiously neglected field. While the efficiency of contract law rules has received much attention, the same cannot be said of the more basic question why contracts should be enforced. The reliance and autonomy explanations which contract theorists most frequently offer are moreover unpersuasive. Reliance theories would ground relief on detrimental reliance, and fail to explain why promisees should be given an incentive to rely. Autonomy theories misfire by failing to account for the conventional nature of promissory institutions, and do not explain why they ought to exist, as opposed to any number of other conventions (or …

Cross Purposes & Unintended Consequences--Karl Llewellyn, Article 2 And The Limits Of Social Transformation, Danielle K. Hart

Danielle K Hart

Despite attempts to reform the law to eliminate hierarchies that subordinate groups of people, the law usually ends up reinstantiating those hierarchies. This “preservation through transformation” phenomenon occurs consistently, over time and across legal disciplines. Karl Llewellyn’s efforts at drafting Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code are no different. Llewellyn attempted a paradigm shift in contract formation when he sought to decouple contract law from its formalistic roots and bring it back in touch with reality on the ground. But in so doing, the law-in-action strand of Legal Realism ended up working at cross purposes with the other, critical …

Contract Law Now--Reality Meets Legal Fictions, Danielle K. Hart

Danielle K Hart

Modern contract law is designed to achieve a fundamental objective, namely, to ensure that voluntary agreements between private parties are legally binding. The appropriateness of this objective and the assumptions underlying it are rarely questioned. Legal scholars, practitioners, and policymakers alike presuppose that the binding-nature of contracts is a desirable and a positive feature of our legal system. But are the assumptions underlying the modern contract system sound? Do people behave in the way that contract law supposes? And are the concepts of voluntary, informed consent and freedom from state interference really the hallmarks of the modern contract system? This …

Contract As Convention, F. H. Buckley

F. H. Buckley

Contract theory is a curiously neglected field. While the efficiency of contract law rules has received much attention, the same cannot be said of the more basic question why contracts should be enforced. The reliance and autonomy explanations which contract theorists most frequently offer are moreover unpersuasive. Reliance theories would ground relief on detrimental reliance, and fail to explain why promisees should be given an incentive to rely. Autonomy theories misfire by failing to account for the conventional nature of promissory institutions, and do not explain why they ought to exist, as opposed to any number of other conventions (or …

Contract As Convention, F. H. Buckley

F. H. Buckley

Contract theory is a curiously neglected field. While the efficiency of contract law rules has received much attention, the same cannot be said of the more basic question why contracts should be enforced. The reliance and autonomy explanations which contract theorists most frequently offer are moreover unpersuasive. Reliance theories would ground relief on detrimental reliance, and fail to explain why promisees should be given an incentive to rely. Autonomy theories misfire by failing to account for the conventional nature of promissory institutions, and do not explain why they ought to exist, as opposed to any number of other conventions (or …

Contracts As Plans, Curtis Bridgeman

Curtis Bridgeman

This paper offers an original theory of contract law that draws from recent work in the philosophy of action and legal theory. Human beings are essentially planning creatures. Making plans and following through with them is crucial to everyday practical reasoning both for individuals acting alone and individuals acting together. This somewhat intuitive point was not fully appreciated in the philosophy of action as recently as twenty years ago, when Michael Bratman began to point out the inadequacies of the then-dominant view of rationality. Recently, Scott Shapiro has been applying Bratman’s insights on practical reasoning to debates in legal theory …