Law Commons^™

Capture In Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward The Common Good?, Lawrence G. Baxter

Lawrence G. Baxter

Abstract

“Regulatory capture” is central to regulatory analysis yet is a troublesome concept. It is difficult to prove and sometimes seems refuted by outcomes unfavorable to powerful interests. Nevertheless, the process of bank regulation and supervision fosters a closeness between regulator and regulated that would seem to be conducive to “capture” or at least to fostering undue sympathy by regulators for the companies they oversee. The influence of very large financial institutions has also become so great that financial regulation appears to have become excessively distorted in favor of these entities and to the detriment of many other legitimate interests, …

How "Big" Became Bad: America's Underage Fling With Universal Banks, Lawrence G. Baxter

Lawrence G. Baxter

In little more than a decade gigantic new financial institutions have emerged in America. These organizations are quite different from their predecessors in that they share the highly complex, diversified characteristics of foreign “universal banks.” They are still in the process of developing experienced and mature operational and risk management systems. During this same period, the regulatory framework necessary to match the size, power and hazards generated by these new universal banks remains underdeveloped, and the primary framework around which the system is being constructed, namely Basel II, lies in tatters in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-08. …