Law Commons^™

Liquidity, Systemic Risk, And The Bankruptcy Treatment Of Financial Contracts, Riz Mokal

Riz Mokal

Reward The Stalking Horse Or Preserve The Estate: Determining The Appropriate Standard Of Review For Awarding Break-Up Fees In § 363 Sales, Zachary Frimet

Zachary Frimet

Following the surge of bankruptcies in the wake of the Great Recession, a growing and somewhat controversial trend has emerged whereby companies seeking to purchase a debtor’s assets in bankruptcy frequently make use of Section 363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (“§ 363”). In general, § 363 sales are accomplished via public auction. This aspect of § 363 exposes initial bidders, known in bankruptcy as “stalking horses bidders”, to the risk that they will commit time and resources in pursuit of the acquisition and yet fail to succeed as the prevailing bidder. To hedge against this risk, stalking horse …

The History And Rationale For A Separate Bank Resolution Process, Thomas Fitzpatrick, Moira Kearney-Marks, James Thomson

James B Thomson

Everyone recognizes the need to have a credible resolution regime in place for fi nancial companies whose failure could harm the entire financial system, but people disagree about which regime is best. The emergence of the parallel banking system has led policymakers to reconsider the dividing line between fi rms that should be resolved in bankruptcy and firms that should be subject to a special resolution regime. A look at the history of insolvency resolution in this country suggests that a blended approach is worth considering. Activities that have potential systemic impact might be best handled administratively, while all other …

Righting Others' Wrongs: A Critical Analysis Of Clawback Suits In The Wake Of Madoff-Type Ponzi Schemes And Other Financial Frauds, Amy Sepinwall

Amy J. Sepinwall

In a typical Ponzi scheme, early investors earn “profits” not through any legitimate investment activity on the part of the Ponzi scheme operator; instead the operator simply transfers money that later investors deposit to the earlier investors who seek redemptions. As such, when the scheme goes bust, as it must, the Ponzi scheme operator will not have enough money to cover all of the investors’ deposits, let alone the earnings on those deposits that the investors thought they were owed. Should the scheme’s winners – i.e., those who withdrew more money than they deposited – be compelled to return their …

Resolving Large, Complex Financial Firms, Thomas Fitzpatrick, Mark Greenlee, James Thomson

James B Thomson

How to best manage the failure of systemically important fi nancial fi rms was the theme of a recent conference at which the latest research on the issue was presented. Here we summarize that research, the discussions that it sparked, and the areas where considerable work remains.