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Full-Text Articles in Law
Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson
Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson
Jonathan C. Lipson
This paper uses “institutional analysis”—the study of the relative capacities of markets, courts, and regulators—to make three claims about financial crises.
First, financial crises are increasingly a problem of “regulatory displacement.” Through the ad hoc rescues of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank reforms of 2010, regulators displace market and judicial processes that ordinarily prevent financial distress from becoming financial crises. Because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial services firms, however, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: market concentration and complexity. Indeed, regulators may inadvertently aggravate these conditions through resolution tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and …
Improving Fraudulent Transfer Law In Leverage Buy-Outs Through Judicial Certainty & Reliability, Vincent V. Hilldrup
Improving Fraudulent Transfer Law In Leverage Buy-Outs Through Judicial Certainty & Reliability, Vincent V. Hilldrup
Vincent V. Hilldrup
LBOs that file for bankruptcy are routinely challenged under fraudulent transfer law, where plaintiffs allege that the LBO unreasonably reduced the target’s liquidity and capital adequacy, saddled it with debt and was completed as a means of funneling company assets to both current and former shareholders. These cases will bestow upon bankruptcy courts the responsibility and power of efficiently allocating billions of dollars to classes of creditors and clawing back funds from shareholders. Since these cases will have a crucial impact on the overall economy, it is imperative that bankruptcy courts wield their authority and power in a predictable, fair, …
Islamic Banking In India, Mubashshir Sarshar
• The Credit Crisis And Subprime Litigation: How Fraud Without Motive ‘Makes Little Economic Sense’, Peter Hamner
• The Credit Crisis And Subprime Litigation: How Fraud Without Motive ‘Makes Little Economic Sense’, Peter Hamner
Peter Hamner
The recent collapse of the financial markets spurred numerous lawsuits seeking a faulty party. Many plaintiffs argue that market participants committed securities fraud. They claim that deficient subprime loans caused the financial crisis. These risky loans were allegedly originated by banks to be sold off to third parties. The subprime loans were securitized and spread throughout the financial markets. The risk these loans presented was allegedly not disclosed to the buyers of the loans and securities on the loans. As these deficient loans and securities began to default the financial markets came to a halt. This article argues that securities …