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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
An Efficiency-Based Explanation For Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, Kenneth M. Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.
An Efficiency-Based Explanation For Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, Kenneth M. Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.
Kenneth Ayotte
No abstract provided.
Bankruptcy Law As A Liquidity Provider, Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel
Bankruptcy Law As A Liquidity Provider, Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel
Kenneth Ayotte
Since the outset of the recent financial crisis, liquidity problems have been cited as the cause behind the bankruptcies and near bankruptcies of numerous firms, ranging from Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in 2008 to Kodak more recently. This paper expands the prevailing normative theory of corporate bankruptcy — the Creditors’ Bargain theory — to include a role for bankruptcy as a provider of liquidity. The Creditors’ Bargain theory argues that bankruptcy law should be limited to solving problems caused by multiple, uncoordinated creditors, but focuses almost exclusively on the problem of creditor runs. We argue that two well-known problems …
Bankruptcy Or Bailouts?, Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel
Bankruptcy Or Bailouts?, Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel
Kenneth Ayotte
The usual reaction if one mentions bankruptcy as a mechanism for addressing a financial institution’s default is incredulity. Those who favor the rescue of troubled financial institutions, and even those who prefer that their assets be promptly sold to a healthier institution, treat bankruptcy as anathema. Everyone seems to agree that nothing good can come from bankruptcy. Indeed, the Chapter 11 filing by Lehman Brothers has been singled out by many the primary cause of the severe economic and financial contraction that followed, and proof that bankruptcy is disorderly and ineffective. As a result, ad-hoc rescue lending to avoid bankruptcy …
Legal Entities As Transferable Bundles Of Contracts, Kenneth Ayotte, Henry Hansmann
Legal Entities As Transferable Bundles Of Contracts, Kenneth Ayotte, Henry Hansmann
Kenneth Ayotte
The large, modern business corporation is frequently organized as a complex cluster of hundreds of corporate subsidiaries under the common control of a single corporate parent. Our Article provides new theory and supportive evidence to help explain this structure. We focus, in particular on the advantages of subsidiary entities in providing the option to transfer some or all of the firm's contractual rights and obligations in the future. The theory not only sheds light on corporate subsidiaries but also illuminates a basic function of all types of legal entities, from partnerships to nonprofit corporations. We show that when, as is …