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- Agency Problem (1)
- Anti-Director Right Index (ADRI) (1)
- Bad-Law Jurisdiction (1)
- Controlling Family Shareholder (1)
- Controlling Minority Structure (CMS) (1)
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- Controlling Shareholder (1)
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- One-Share-Multiple-Vote (OSMV) (1)
- One-Share-One-Vote (OSOV) (1)
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- Roving Controller (1)
- Securities Law (1)
- Self-Dealing (1)
- Stationary Controller (1)
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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Law
Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang
Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, many questions still remain unanswered. In particular, an important puzzle in a bad-law jurisdiction is: why some controlling shareholders (“roving controllers”) loot the entire corporate assets at once, and why others (“stationary controllers”) siphon a part of corporate assets on a continuous basis. To solve this conundrum, this Article provides analytical frameworks exploring the behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. To begin with, I reinterpret Olson’s political theory of “banditry” in the context of corporate governance in developing countries. Based on a new taxonomy of controlling shareholders (“roving controllers” …
Re-Envisioning Investors’ Anti-Director Rights Index: Theory, Criticism, And Implications, Sang Yop Kang
Re-Envisioning Investors’ Anti-Director Rights Index: Theory, Criticism, And Implications, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
‘Law and Finance’ theory – which offers analytical frameworks to measure the protection of public investors and the quality of corporate governance – has dominated the comparative corporate governance scholarship in the last decade. So far, many proponents and critics have had debates on the relevance of the theory and the implications of the theory’s empirical studies. Several important points in relation to shareholder protection, however, have been highly neglected in these debates. In particular, the significance of one-share-one-vote (OSOV) rule has been inappropriately underestimated. In response, this Article explores (1) why OSOV is an utmost critical component in corporate …