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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Why Is Torture Different And How Different Is It?, Sherry F. Colb
Why Is Torture Different And How Different Is It?, Sherry F. Colb
Sherry Colb
Almost every serious commentator to address the moral and legal question of torture has taken for granted the proposition that the infliction of torture is a sufficiently grave evil to require a distinctly demanding moral scrutiny, one that categorically sets torture apart from other terrible things (including killing) that human beings do to one another. To borrow from the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence, most people agree that torture is "different. " Under the Eighth Amendment, the fact that death is different does not rule out its application; it simply alters the relevant procedural and substantive standards. By contrast, many …
Probabilities In Probable Cause And Beyond: Statistical Versus Concrete Harms, Sherry F. Colb
Probabilities In Probable Cause And Beyond: Statistical Versus Concrete Harms, Sherry F. Colb
Sherry Colb
No abstract provided.
Insane Fear: The Discriminatory Category Of "Mentally Ill And Dangerous", Sherry F. Colb
Insane Fear: The Discriminatory Category Of "Mentally Ill And Dangerous", Sherry F. Colb
Sherry Colb
This article considers the constitutional and moral implications of the distinction the law draws between different classes of dangerous people, depending upon their status as mentally ill or mentally well. Those who are mentally well benefit from the right to freedom from incarceration unless and until they commit a crime. By contrast, dangerous people who are mentally ill are subject to potentially indefinite "civil" preemptive confinement. In a relatively recent case, Kansas v. Hendricks, the United States Supreme Court upheld the post-prison civil confinement of Leroy Hendricks, a man who had served prison time after pleading guilty to child molestation. …
Oil And Water: Why Retribution And Repentance Do Not Mix, Sherry F. Colb
Oil And Water: Why Retribution And Repentance Do Not Mix, Sherry F. Colb
Sherry Colb
No abstract provided.
"Whodunit" Versus "What Was Done": When To Admit Character Evidence In Criminal Cases, Sherry Colb
"Whodunit" Versus "What Was Done": When To Admit Character Evidence In Criminal Cases, Sherry Colb
Sherry Colb
In virtually every jurisdiction in the United States, the law of evidence prohibits parties from offering proof of an individual's general character traits to suggest that, on a specific occasion, the individual behaved in a manner consistent with those traits. In a criminal trial in particular, the law prohibits a prosecutor's introduction of evidence about the defendant's character as proof of his guilt. In this Article, Professor Colb proposes that the exclusion of defendant character evidence is appropriate in one category of cases but inappropriate in another. In the first category, which Professor Colb calls "whodunit" cases, the parties agree …
Freedom From Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different From All Other Rights?, Sherry F. Colb
Freedom From Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different From All Other Rights?, Sherry F. Colb
Sherry Colb
American constitutional jurisprudence has long accepted the notion that the exercise of certain rights can only be restricted by the government if the restriction satisfies strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has identified such rights as fundamental often by relying on an expansive interpretation of the word "liberty" in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In this Article, Professor Colb argues that the Supreme Court has failed to recognize the right to physical liberty itself as a fundamental right. She demonstrates that at present conduct that is not itself constitutionally protected may serve as the basis for imprisonment even …
Some Thoughts On The Conduct/Status Distinction, Sherry F. Colb
Some Thoughts On The Conduct/Status Distinction, Sherry F. Colb
Sherry Colb
No abstract provided.